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Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement:
Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11
D. Michael Risinger*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been generally accepted at least since God gave Moses
the Eighth Commandment that one should not bear false witness
against one's neighbor. The standard English translation of that
Commandment makes it sound as if God were thinking primarily
in terms of lawsuits.' However that may be, fabricating a law-
suit is recognized as a serious wrong. And, though dishonestly
defending a lawsuit may not generate the same disapproval as
dishonestly bringing one, in the individual case it is certainly as
dishonest and probably as unjust.
Lawyers quite clearly may play a role in fostering or dis-
couraging dishonesty in lawsuits. Indeed, they may misuse their.
office to become the authors of such dishonesty, and as long as
dishonesty exists lawyers will be suspected of having a hand in
it, even though it is clear enough that dishonesty can occur with-
out a lawyer's actual connivance, and even in the face of his best
efforts to prevent it.
The attorney wears many different hats. The lawyer's
proper role in civil counseling, civil litigation, criminal defense
work, and criminal prosecution varies sharply from area to area,
and different ethical standards inevitably apply to each role.
What is improper in counseling before the fact may be proper
in litigating after the fact; what is proper in criminal defense
work may be improper in civil litigation; and what is ethical
for a criminal defense attorney may be improper for a prose-
cutor. Each function presents its own role-structured ethical
dilemmas, and a separate code of ethics is often appropriate
to each.2
* B.A. Yale University 1966; J.D. Harvard Law School 1969; As-
sociate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1. "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." Exo-
Dus 20:16 (King James).
2. This fact is not effectively embodied in existing codes, which
too often fail to recognize role differences, and contain overgeneraliza-
tion, internal contradiction, and high sounding generalities more intended
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The responsibilities of the attorney in civil litigation, to
which this Article is limited, differ from those in criminal defense
work primarily because of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.8 Because we fear the government's awesome power and sus-
pect its possible motivations, we allow the criminal defendant to
put the government to its proof. The existence of the right cre-
ates a context and an opportunity to enforce other basic rights,
such as the right to privacy. But in the civil context the govern-
ment is usually not a party. There is a presumed parity of re-
sources between plaintiff and defendant, at least closer than that
between the government and criminal defendant, and there is no
way of predicting which party a disparity in resources will favor.
Further, individual liberty is rarely at stake in civil litigation,
and indirect threats to civil liberties are not nearly as great as
in the criminal context. For these reasons there is no constitu-
tional equivalent in civil cases to the privilege against self-
incrimination, and a civil defendant has no constitutional right
to put a plaintiff to his proof.4 Therefore, it can quite properly
be demanded of a defending party, and his attorney, that all alle-
gations and denials be honest, even if this means admitting
liability in some cases.
On the other hand, the civil litigation attorney does not
have the same ethical responsibilities as a prosecuting attorney
to reveal information helpful to his opponent. Because the
for public relations with non-lawyers than for the guidance of the lawyer
facing a tough dilemma and seeking a resolution to it consistent with
the ethical requirements of the role he is then playing in the legal sys-
tem. See generally M. FREEDM= A, LAWYER'S ETHIcs n AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEm (1975). See also Thode, The Ethical Standards for the Advocate,
39 TEXAs L. REv. 575 (1961).
The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) was promulgated in 1969 to remedy some of the problems
of overgenerality of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which it did;
but many problems remain in the final formulation. See generally
FREEDmAN, supra at 9-26. And there is a serious question about how
much of either the Code or the old Canons is concerned with ethics and
how much is actually directed toward trade union concerns. See, e.g.,
ABA CODE Or PRoFEssIoNAL REsPoNsIBnTY DR 2-101, 102, 103, & 105,
pertaining to advertising by attorneys.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. The language of the fifth amendment is specifically limited to
criminal cases. However, a common law right allowing a civil defendant
to put plaintiff to his proof has been widely assumed. See, e.g., Miley
v. Walls, 1 Dowl 648 (Ex. 1833); Pogson, Truth in Pleadings, 8
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 41, 47-48 (1930). Insofar as there ever was such a com-
mon law right, the provisions of FEm. R. Civ. P. 8(b) and 11 requiring
honesty in denials, and FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and 36 requiring honesty in
answering requests for admissions, have abolished it in federal practice.
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prosecutor wields such power over the lives and liberty of the
people, he must be most closely mewed up by the check of
conscience. A prosecutor has or should have a general ethical
responsibility to reveal and present any information which might
aid in arriving at the truth, regardless of more particularized
rules on pleading, discovery, and burden of persuasion.5 The
civil attorney, on the other hand, may rely on the particularized
rules the law has provided in these areas to define the limits
of his and his client's duty to disclose information detrimental to
their case.6
In speaking of the allegations made in a lawsuit, I have been
careful thus far to speak of honesty and not of truth. As Henry
Berry Pogson has pointed out, to think primarily in terms of
truth when defining a lawyer's duty with respect to allegations
in pleadings and other papers is to miss the point.7 In any issu-
able controversy, with one side alleging a proposition and the
other side denying it, one side's position is inevitably untrue,
though both sides may be honest in asserting their contentions.
This is the very situation that the legal system exists to resolve.
Furthermore, even today, fictions may play some part in litiga-
tion, though they are clearly not as prevalent as at common law.8
Where such fictions exist and are generally recognized, their con-
ventional allegation does not create questions of dishonesty, even
though the allegations are concededly untrue. This is not to say
that truth has nothing to do with honesty. The basis of a
5. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963); FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at ch. 7; Note, Discovery and
Disclosure, Dual Aspects of the Prosecutor's Role in Criminal Procedure,
34 GEo. WASH. L. RBv. 92 (1965); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional
Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
6. See text accompanying notes 187-88 infra.
7. Pogson, supra note 4, at 41, 43.
8. For example, the problem of domiciliary allegations by foreign
residents in "friendly" divorce cases in states such as Nevada is probably
best handled by recognizing that the allegations are fictional. The ABA
Committee on Ethics and Grievances took the position in its Opinion 84
that a lawyer could not ethically have a hand in such allegations where
they were known to be false. ABA Formal Opinion on Ethics No. 84
(Aug. 27, 1932). This was at a time when the Supreme Court held in
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903), that such divorces were collater-
ally attackable on this ground despite the full faith and credit clause.
With the Supreme Court's reversal of this position in Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343 (1948), Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), and
Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951), the vitality of Andrews has been
drained. See generally H. Dsuxns, Las, ETmcs 80-82 (1953) and au-
thorities cited therein.
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lawyer's honesty is a process of reasonable judgment honestly
undertaken. Underlying this process are certain conventional
epistemological assumptions of a rough empirical kind appro-
priate to the legal process.9 It is clear at the very least that if
a proposition is tested against the kind of truth so assumed, and
the proposition appears to be affirmatively untrue, it cannot be
honestly alleged without a fictional convention authorizing it. In
other words, fictions aside, it is dishonest for a lawyer to allege
or be the agent for alleging propositions he affirmatively knows
to be untrue. This is neither a startling nor a very controver-
sial statement. It is also of very little help in deciding the hard
cases, for the hard cases arise when the lawyer is not sure of
either the truth or the falsity of the proposition in question.
Despite the difficulty of determining what constitutes
honesty in the context of a lawsuit, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FED. R. Civ. P.) and analogous state rules impose an
obligation on attorneys to pursue litigation honestly and provide
potentially severe penalties for those who fail to do so. This
Article concerns one such rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 11, requiring
honesty in pleading. It will examine the historical development
of Rule 11 and discuss the serious inconsistency between the obli-
gations the rule imposes and the mechanism it provides for their
enforcement. It will then propose an interpretation of Rule 11
that allows the use of enforcement measures better suited to
achieving the rule's objectives.
II. THE RULE ON ITS FACE
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is the most famous and
widely applicable binding precept 10 regulating lawyer honesty in
9. See generally Allen, Scientific Versus Judicial Fact-Finding in
the United States, 2 IEEE TRANsACTIONs ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBER-
NEics 548 (1972); Allen, The Doctors vs. the Lawyers, 39 CoNN. MEDi-
cnqE 112 (1975).
10. An ethical precept is binding if members of the profession must
follow it in their practice on pain of discipline. It is merely advisory
if somebody has issued it for the recommended guidance of the profes-
sion, but no official body has indicated that not following it can be the
basis of disciplinary action. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity is merely advisory in some jurisdictions. In others it has been made
binding. The absence of a large body of literature in this area leaves
many questions unexplored. Do disciplinary bodies apply a sort of Nur-
emburg Principle for cases of first impression which turns a precept from
advisory to binding? What happens when the binding precepts of two
systems collide, and the same person is a member of both systems? If
federal courts recognize a practice as acceptable which state authorities
[Vol. 61:1
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pleading. In the 37 years of its existence, Rule 11 has been cited
in relatively few cases"" though it is clearly being invoked more
often of late.' 2 While the rule appears on its face to be
reasonably straightforward and uncontroversial, the handful of
courts that have treated it more than in passing have had more
trouble with its interpretation than a glance would suggest.'3
The rule reads as follows:
SIGNING OF PLEADINGS
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented
by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or stat-
ute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath
must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowl-
edge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this
rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a
wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken
if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Our initial examination of the rule may be most conveniently
divided into two parts: the duties required of counsel by the
rule and the mechanisms prescribed to enforce those duties.
A. REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE
Rule 11 requires all pleadings to be signed in an individual
name and with an accompanying address. The term ",pleadings"
consider unethical, can the state discipline a lawyer who follows that
practice in federal proceedings in that state? Of course, like any binding
legislation, binding precepts of professional ethics can create problems
of civil disobedience. For example, while a binding precept may state
that it is unethical to advance costs to a plaintiff without expectation
of repayment, there are situations where many people might feel that
it was indeed ethically commendable or even required that they do so.
A thorough examination of these questions is beyond the scope of this
Article.
11. See cases collected in 2A Moons's FEERAL PJRAcTEcE 1 11.01 et
seq. (1975), and 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILER, FEDERAL PRCTICE AND PRo-
cEDuRu, § 1331 et seq. (1969).
12. Nearly half the adversary Rule 11 based motions reported since
the promulgation of the rules in 1938 have come in the last five years.
See note 116 and accompanying text infra.
13. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 110-38 infra.
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is a narrow term of art applying to a limited number of docu-
ments as defined by Rule 7 (a) ,'14 but the duties imposed by Rule
11 also seem to apply to motions and other documents through
incorporation by reference in Rule 7(b) (2). 15 The rule widely
followed under "Field Code" pleading systems that all pleadings
had to be supported by a verifying affidavit, is specifically abol-
ished.' 6 The old equity rule requiring sworn testimony to over-
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 7 (a) refers to "pleadings" as follows:
There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counter-
claim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the
answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a
person who -was not an original party is summoned under the
provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party
answer.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 7 (b) (2) provides:
The rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of
form of pleadings apply to all motions and other papers pro-
vided for by these rules.
Although this Rule refers only to "signing . . . and other matters of
form," it seems that good ground is part and parcel of the formal require-
ment of signature found in Rule 11. This was the opinion of the only
court to have considered the matter. See U.S. ex rel. Foster Wheeler
Corp. v. American Surety Co. of N.Y., 25 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
This reading seems also to have been accepted by Prof. Moore, see
2A MooRa's FEDERAL PRACTICE fI 7.05 (1975), and by Wright and Miller,
see 5 WRIGr & MILLER, supra note 11, at § 1332 n. 8.
16. The history of the general requirement of verification is a sad
one. Prior to the mid-19th century, pleadings were verified by party
oath only in exceptional circumstances, some of which are discussed in
text accompanying note 46 infra. Perhaps the specialness and rarity of
the oath made it psychologically more effective, perhaps not. But David
Dudley Field was of the opinion that a general requirement that all
pleadings be sworn would have a salutary effect on the honesty of the
whole system. What Field opined he inserted into the 1848 New York
Practice Code (he was chairman of the Commission responsible for that
mighty work, and its principal drafter), and so such a requirement be-
came law. 1848 N.Y. Laws, c. 379, § 133. The section was changed in
1849 to dispense with the requirement of verification per se, but to allow
either party to require verification of all subsequent pleadings by the
simple expedient of verifying his own. 1849 N.Y. Laws, c. 438, § 157.
Most states adopted practice codes in the 19th or early 20th centuries
which followed one of the two patterns. See generally C. CraK, CoDE
PLEADING §,36 (2d ed. 1947).
Field would probably have been shocked to find that his morality-
promoting proposal created problems, and even had somewhat the oppo-
site of its intended effect. The trouble with these general verification
requirements was twofold. First, they created conceptual problems,
based on the idea of truth and the magic of the oath. See, e.g., Bell v.
Brown, 22 Cal. 671 (1863) (verification of inconsistent counts raises spec-
ter of per se perjury), and note 86 infra. A modern example of such
a problem may be found in City of Kingsport v. Steel & Roof Struc-
ture, Inc., 500 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1974), where the court of appeals
[Vol. 61:1
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come an answer, which inevitably resolved one-on-one swearing
contests in favor of'a defendant, is also abolished.17
Pleadings of a party represented by an attorney must be
signed by the attorney. The rule speaks of signature by the
"attorney of record." This raises the first question of inter-
pretation. Does this mean that an attorney must have filed a
formal appearance to be subject to the signature requirement,
or that by complying with the signature requirement an attorney
becomes an attorney of record? If the former, some of the bite
could, at least in theory, be taken out of Rule 11 by the attorney's
staying off the record until after the pleading stage, ,and the
client's then signing the pleadings pro se, as Rule 11 permits for
one "not represented by counsel." The central thrust of the first
section of Rule 11, however, is to obtain on the record the individ-
ual signature of any attorney professionally responsible for the
pleading filed. Thus it is more consistent with the purpose of
the signature requirement to conclude that whenever an attorney
has had any substantial part in the preparation of pleadings, the
party is "represented by counsel" within the meaning of Rule
11, and the attorney therefore must sign the pleading. Since Rule
11 is designed to replace the codes' major reliance on party veri-
fication by affidavit as the central mechanism for obtaining
honesty in pleading with central reliance on attorney good
faith,18 an attorney who is substantially involved in preparation
reversed the district court's erroneous position that a plea both interpos-
ing the defense of the statute of limitations and requesting indemnity
violated Rule 11. Another example of the problem can be seen in the
lower's court's treatment of Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels, 342 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 363 (1966). See text accompanying notes
174-91 infra. Second, the general requirement of verification could
often be counterproductive. It permitted rationalizations by which the
attorney and the client could pass the buck to each other, the client
pointing to the legal jargon of the pleading and the attorney to the party
verification, neither taking any responsibility either psychologically or
practically for content. Actual perjury prosecutions for verification vio-
lations were very rare, for obvious reasons of volume and difficulty of
proof. The verification requirement was taken so lightly that it en-
couraged cynicism rather than honesty and favored "the unscrupulous
litigant at the expense of his conscientious opponent." R. MILLAR, CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF TaE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 173 (1952).
17. The demise of this irrational rule had no mourners. For an il-
lustration of the rule in practice and its tendency to benefit possibly un-
deserving defendants, see Greenfield v. Blumenthal, 69 F.2d 294 (3d Cir.
1934).
18. "If the courts themselves promulgate a specific rule on the sub-
ject in the form of the Federal Rule the result ought to be that the courts
would feel a more serious obligation resting upon them to enforce the
rules and attorneys might take more seriously their obligations on this
19761
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of pleadings must bear the responsibility of ensuring their
honesty.19
Rule 11 makes the signature of an attorney a certification
that he has in fact read the pleading. It may have been drafted
in part or in whole by someone else, but the signing attorney
must have read it. The signature is also a certification that, "to
the best of [the attorney's] knowledge, information and belief
there is good ground to support [the pleading] and.., it has
not been interposed for delay." The insertion of the certification
that the pleading has not been interposed for delay seems
logically redundant, since a pleading interposed only for delay
could not have "good ground" no matter how that term is ulti-
mately defined, and a pleading with independent "good ground"
is not likely to be rendered improper because tactical considera-
tions of delay entered into the ultimate decision of whether or
not to file an otherwise honest, meritorious, and proper plead-
ing.2 0
subject." Gavit, The New Federal Rules and State Procedure, 25
A.B.A.J. 367, 371 (1939). See U.S. ex rel. Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Ameri-
can Surety Co. of N.Y., 25 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.NY. 1938). As Prof. Sun,
derland, one of the drafters of the rules, observed: "In view of the fu-
tility of ordinary verifications of pleadings, this plan of a certificate
of counsel seems at least worth trying." Sunderland, The Avail-
ability of the New Federal Rules for Use in the State Courts of Ohio,
4 OHIO STATE L.J. 143, 146 (1938).
19. The only court to consider the question of whether a profession-
ally aided party can sign pro se has intimated that the party cannot do
so without his lawyer's violating Rule 11. Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325,
1328 (1st Cir. 1971). See also First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-
Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871
(1957).
20. We shall see that the enforcement provisions of Rule 11 reveal
a history of less than careful draftsmanship. See, text accompanying
notes 33-36 infra. There are other indications of this carelessness as well.
The Advisory Committee note to Rule 11 states in pertinent part:
This is substantially the content of Equity Rules 24 (Signature
of Counsel) and 21 (Scandal and Impertinence) consolidated and
unified. Compare Equity Rule 36 (Officers Before Whom Plead-
ings Verified). Compare to similar purposes, English Rules
Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice-1937) 0 19, r 4,
and Great Austialian Gold Mining Co. v. Martin, 'fL.R. 5 CbDiv 1,
10 (1877). Subscription of pleadings is required under many
codes. 2 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9265; NYRCP (1937) Rule
91; 2 ND Comp. Laws Ann (1913) § 7455.
This note is virtually unchanged from the note accompanying Rule 11
(then Rule 10) in the first preliminary draft, see ADvIsoRY ConMrvnr
ox RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PREmINARY DRAFT or RULES OF CIvIL
PRocEDuR 20-21 (May 1936) (hereinafter cited as PRELIInnARY DRAFT)
and it seems inaccurate as applied to the final draft. In the first prelim-
inary draft of the Federal Rules, there was no provision corresponding to
Rule 12(f), which, as originally promulgated in 1938, provided for a
[Vol. 61:1
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What constitutes "good ground" is a difficult and many-
faceted question. The phrase has an interesting, if not too help-
ful, history which is intimately intertwined with the history of
the signature requirement itself. The origin of the "good ground"
language in the context of equity pleading was an 1838 treatise
on equity pleading by Joseph Story, in which he wrote:
We may conclude, what is here said on the general structure
and form of a bill, by the remark, that every Bill, whether
original or not, must have the signature of counsel annexed
motion to strike any "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter" from a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), 308 U.S. 679 (1939). In
the preliminary draft the only section arguably authorizing a motion to
strike for scandal was the "similar action" clause of Rule 11 (then Rule
10): "Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter . . .
[is] inserted." Pm1nvmiARY DRAFT, supra at 20. Thus, the allegation
that the Rule embodied the content of Equity Rule 21 was arguablyjustified at least in part, since Equity Rule 21 provided for a motion to
strike for scandal or impertinence, a common practice both at law and in
equity for generations. See Craven v. Wright, 2 P.Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep.
691 (K.B. 1723); 1842 Equity R. 26. Nevertheless, the claim that the pre-
liminary draft of Rule 11 (then Rule 10) was a "substantial" consolida-
tion of Equity Rules 24 and 21 was weak because the draft of the rule
contained no provision for a motion to strike for impertinence. Instead
the ground "indecency" was inserted, a ground without deep common law
or code pleading roots. The ambiguities of construction involved in the
"similar action" clause are discussed in W. SuLIavAN, A TREATiSE ON THE
FEDmara RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 367 (1949).
In the final draft of the Federal Rules the precise office of Equity
Rule 21 was provided for in Rule 12(f). The only thing the "similar
action"' clause in Rule 11 as finally promulgated could refer to was the
possibility of attorney discipline mentioned in the preceding clause of the
Rule, a feature not found in Equity Rule 21, or specifically provided for
under any Equity Rule. Thus, despite what the Advisory Committee
note says, Equity Rule 21 has nothing to do with Rule 11 as finally
promulgated. Moreover there is obviously much more going on in the
Rule than ever envisioned by the Equity Rules. The phrase providing
that a pleading "may be stricken as sham and false" did not come from
equity practice, but the Advisory Committee note is silent both as to the
antecedents of this phrase, and how it is intended to operate. Carrying
forward an advisory committee note of doubtful appropriateness from an
earlier draft to the final draft is one indication that Rule 11 may in some
of its particulars be a Homeric nod.
It is of utmost importance to remember that each of the terms re-
ferred to above as well as others we shall discuss, were terms of art with
generally well defined meanings at common law and under the code
practice of the 19th and early 20th century. The drafters of the Federal
Rules did not always keep this point in mind. For example, viewed in
light of these definitions, the 1938 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f), quoted in part
supra, suffers from one of the abuses which it seeks to remedy, namely,
redundancy. The word "immaterial" and the word "impertinent" both
meant and were incorporated to mean exactly the same thing: irrelevant.
Further, the word "redundant" means nothing more than that the repeti-
tion of a material allegation is unnecessary and therefore irrelevant. All
19761
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to it. This rule appears to have been adopted at an early
period, and at least as early as the time of Sir Thomas More.
The great object of this rule is, to secure regularity, relevancy,
and decency in the allegations of the Bill, and the responsibility
and guaranty of counsel, that upon the instructions given to
them, and the case laid before them, there is good ground for
the suit in the manner, in which it is framed.2 1
In the quoted passage it seems as if the great man is as much
dictating his view of what the role of counsel's signature should
be as narrating what that role was in equity practice up to that
time. It appears true that the rule stemmed from the time of Sir
Thomas More, but the requirement of counsel's signature was
originally a boon rather than a burden to counsel, for it ensured
that they were consulted before a Bill was filed.2 2 Their task
redundancies are irrelevant, though all irrelevancies are not necessarily
redundant. Thus the single term "irrelevant" (or "immaterial" or "Im-
pertinent") would encompass the first three bases for striking set forth
in Rule 12 (f). The -preferred term, and that used most commonly in the
19th and early 20th century (and in Rule 21 of the 1912 Equity Rules),
was "impertinent." Perhaps by 1938 the word "impertinent" was prob-
lematic because of its popular connotation of "impolite," not merely "not
pertinent." The use of at least two terms-for example, immaterial and
impertinent-may thus be explained by the drafters' desire to guard
against mistaken definition of the earlier term of art while preserving
the large body of case law interpreting and applying that term.
Similarly, the term "scandalous" was a well defined term of art ap-
plying only to material that was irrelevant, but also something more:
gratuitously insulting, defaming, or immoral. But it was well settled
that to be scandalous, material had to be irrelevant. We may wonder,
then, why a separate ground to strike for scandal was ever provided,
when the more inclusive ground of impertinence or irrelevancy would
have covered the situation. The motivation was probably atavistic, giv-
ing the offended party a stronger name to call the offending material
than merely irrelevant, for the effects of the two motions do not appear
to have ever been different. For an early explanation of the distinctions
between scandal and impertinence, see FowLe's EXCHEQUER PRACTICE 36,
37 (1795). See also B. SHniPmAN, LAw OF EQUITY PLEADING § 241 (1897).
21. J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS ch. 11, § 47 (1838) (footnotes omit-
ted and emphasis supplied).
22. The promulgation of the signature requirement seems to have
had more to do with internecine struggles within the legal profession
than with an attempt to secure honesty on the honor of counsel To un-
derstand this we must examine the split nature of the legal profession
which has obtained in England from antiquity to the present. See gen-
erally H. COHN, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR AND ATTORNATus To 1450
(1929); R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROm ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TnvnS
(1953). The legal profession as a separate calling began to emerge in
England between 1066 and the reign of Edward I (1274-1307). In the
earliest times a party to a law suit usually appeared in person before the
court, and spoke for himself with little aid from anyone. This put the
unlearned or ineloquent at a severe disadvantage, and early on the party
was allowed to bring a learned person to advise him and to speak for
him. Such advisors appear to have been generally allowed at least
[Vol. 61:1
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was the quasi-judicial function of examining the Bill as to form,
and their signature certified nothing concerning the ground of
the Bill, which apparently did not even have to be laid before
them. This was how the office of counsel's signature was under-
earlier than 1150. See CoHN, supra at 169. These persons were "coun-
sel". By the time of Sir Thomas More, Henry VIII's Chancellor from
1529 to 1532, there were various kinds of counsel. The most important
were the serjeants, an elite group who held special royal commissions,
see PouND, supra at 82, and the apprentices at law, or barristers, who
belonged to one of the four barristers' inns of court and were allowed to
plead in all the royal courts except Common Pleas (where the serjeants
had a monopoly) but who did not hold a royal commission as serjeant.
(The term "apprentice at law" was the older term, slowly displaced by
the term "barrister" in the 17th century. Id. at 101). Apprentices were
admitted to practice by their inn, only after a rigorous education, and
were subject to its discipline. Id. at 85, 87-92.
A party can be allowed counsel but still be required to appear in
person, and indeed the privilege of appearing in a suit by an attorney
was not generally granted until long after the right to appear with coun-
sel was recognized. Holdsworth asserted that "[t]he idea that one man
can represent another is foreign to early English Law." 6 W. HoLDs-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 432 (4th ed. 1927). It was not until
the Statute of Westminster 11, 13 Edw. I, c. 10 (1285), that a broad right
to appear by attorney was granted, although the king had occasionally
granted the boon in particular cases prior to that time. The general right
to appear by attorney without at least formal leave of court may have
not been fully established until the reign of Elizabeth I. See COHN, supra
at 271 et seq.; PoUND, supra at 86. This historical development ac-
counts in part for the great functional split in the English profession into
groups now call barristers and solicitors. When the right to appear
by attorney was first granted there of course were few professional at-
torneys, and parties appeared by friends and servants. However, pro-
fessional attorneys-at-law soon appeared, skilled in legal affairs, but
without the professional organization that the barristers had, and subject
to direct discipline by the courts in which they did business. POUND,
supra at 86. Sometime in the 14th century, pleadings began to change
from oral to written, see J. CouND, J. FmDENTHAL & A. MmLER, CAsEs
ON CnL PROcEDURE, 316 n.1 (2d ed. 1974). The onerous task of drafting
these pleadings fell to the attorney, but he had no right to speak in court,
since that privilege was reserved to counsel, that is, to the apprentices
(barristers) and serjeants. Originally attorneys could be heard from
side bar, a partition in Westminster Hall from which cetain ex parte
motions, dealing primarily with pleadings, were made and usually
granted as a matter of course. Even this limited right of audience disap-
peared by the 18th century, however, as the division between barristers
and attorneys solidified. PoUND, supra at 98. As chancery practice grew
more important in the 16th century, the same group of counsel who had
the right of audience in the common law courts served as counsel in the
Court of Equity, but a separate group of attorneys developed called
solicitors (just as in the admiralty and domestic courts the attorneys
were called proctors). Solicitors were at the outset merely agents for
attorneys in the common law courts, but they attached'themselves to the
rising prerogative court of Chancery in the 15th and 16th centuries,
where the name stuck. See id. at 98-111. It may be true that at least
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stood by Story's source, Cooper, and apparently by every other
writer,23 but Story saw a better office for it and gave his view-
initially the right of audience in Chancery was formally unrestricted, but
the prudent man hired an oralist, that is, counsel. See id. at 107. (Noth-
ing further need be said in this Article concerning the proctors and other
practitioners in the Admiralty, Domestic, Merchant (Roman Law) and
Ecclesiastical Courts and their progeny. They also followed a split-pro-
fession pattern in England; "barristers" being called, after the continental
practice, 'Doctors of Laws." See id. at 61-70. These courts had a limited
sphere of jurisdiction, but exercised it until the great reforms of the sec-
ond half of the 19th century.) Another group of persons who then
formed a separate section of the profession were the Masters in Chancery,
whose function and prestige changed greatly over time. Originally they
functioned as common clerks but finally came to have the status of juniorjudges. The title arose before Chancery developed extensive judicial
functions. In the 14th century Chancery was an administrative bureau-
cracy with numerous clerks. Chief among these were Masters, and at
the very head, the Master of the Rolls. Pollock and Maitland indicate
that "Master" .was then a title given to those clerks with a university
degree. F. POLLOcK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY or THE ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE Tnm OF EDWARD I at 174 (2d ed. 1898). With the rise of the
Chancellor's judicial function in the 15th and 16th centuries, the Masters
were delegated various quasi-judicial roles, delegations of power which
ebbed and flowed a good deal over the two centuries between 1500 and
1700 but ended up with the Masters functioning as judicial officers, espe-
cially the Master of the Rolls. By the 16th century their number was
fixed at eleven, plus the Master of the Rolls, and the number remained
constant into the 19th century. See generally G. CRABB, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 535-38 (1829); W. WALSH, OUTLIES OF THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH & AMERIcAN LAW 158-59 (2d ed. 1948). They were supposed to
be learned in the law, and early claimed a status equal to a serjeant
at law. ANONYmOUS, A TREATISE OF THE M sTERs or rTa Cn~mNEcaRs
(circa 1600), reprinted in F. HARGRAVE, A CoLLEcTIoN OF TRAcTS RELATIrVE
TO THE LAws OF ENGLAND 300 (1788) [hereinafter cited as TREATISE OF THE
MAISTERS].
Story's source concerning the origin of the signature requirement is
Cooper. J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS ch. 2, § 47 n.1 (1938). Cooper's
source is a tract written by an anonymous Master of Chancery between
1596 and 1603 and reprinted in 1788 in F. HARGRAVE, A CoLLEcTiON OF
TRAcTs RELATIVE TO T= LAws OF ENGLAND (1788). See G. COOPER, EQurY
PLEADINGS 18 n. (k) (1813). Cooper infers from this piece that sometime
before More's chancellorship the court itself examined a proffered Bill
to see if it was too prolix or contained irrelevant or scandalous matter
before accepting it. This is quite likely correct, but our anonymous
Master is quite clear that this ministerial function was once delegated
to the Masters of Chancery, and was taken from them by Sir Thomas
More and given to Counsel. (He was also quite indignant about it).
TREATISE OF THE MAISTERS, supra at 301.
23. See, e.g., H. MADDOcK, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPALs Am PRAc-
TICE OF THE HIGH CoURT OF CHANcERY 166 (3d Amer. ed. 1827). See also
Brown v. Bruce, 2 Mer. 1, 35 Eng. Rep. 841 (Ch. 1816).
It is quite likely that in some cases one counsel would examine the
bill for form and another conduct the later proceedings. See POUND, su-
pra note 22, at 104. None of this is to say that counsel who performed
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point the stamp of history.24 And, since Story was then on
the Supreme Court, it is not surprising that his vision was incor-
porated as Rule 24 in the Equity Rules of 1842,25 which required
counsel's signature as an affirmation of good ground. The 1842
rule was replaced by the substantially similar 1912 Equity
Rule,26 which also made the lawyer's signature a certification
that there was good ground for the plea. The Advisory Commit-
tee Note to Rule 11, in turn, refers to the 1912 Equity Rule (Rule
24) as the source of Rule 11's provisions.27  Thus the history
of the phrase "good ground" suggests little beyond the phrase
itself except that the original inclusion of the phrase in the fed-
eral rules was based on an historical misconception of the original
function of the signature requirement.
Early decisional law sheds no more light upon the meaning
of the term "good ground" than does its history. The term seems
to have had no more fully analyzed or concrete meaning
his office without due diligence, thereby prejudicing the opposing party,
might not be made to pay costs. See Emerson v. Dallison, 1 Ch. Rep.
192, 21 Eng. Rep. 547 (1660).
24. He did it so well that his position was later accepted (without
his being specifically credited as the source) as both functionally and
historically correct by the Supreme Court of Judicature of England in
Great Australian Gold Mining Co. v. Martin, 5 Ch. D. 1, 10 (1877) (dic-
tum). This is why the Advisory Committee note to Rule 11 refers to
this case. See note 20, supra.
25. Equity R. 24 42 U.S. (1 How.) xlvii (1842) provided:
Every bill shall contain the signature of counsel annexed to it,
which shall be considered as an affirmation on his part that upon
the instructions given to him and the case laid before him, there
is good ground for the suit, in the manner in which it is framed.
26. Equity R. 24, 226 U.S. 655 (1912) provided:
Every bill or other pleading shall be signed individually by one
or more solicitors of record, and such signatures shall be con-
sidered as a certificate by each solicitor that he has read the
pleading so signed by him; that upon the instructions laid before
him regarding the case there is good ground for the same; that
no scandalous matter is inserted in the pleading; and that it is
not interposed for delay.
This rule differed from its predecessor in that it substituted the term
"solicitor" for "counsel" (a change of limited importance in a country
where the bar is not functionally split as it was in England, and the old
terms are mere nostalgic echoes rather than appellations referring to dif-
ferent roles). See note 22 supra. The Rule also extended the require-
ment of signature by counsel to all pleadings, explicitly restored the his-
torical office of being a safeguard against impertinence and scandal, and
added the new certification that the pleading was not interposed for de-
lay. This latter certification is clearly directed at defensive pleadings,
and, as previously stated, seems to overlap with the good ground require-
ment. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
27. See Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Cxv. P. 11, supra note
20.
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than whatever can be gleaned from the words themselves, for
as far as I can discover, the "good ground" standard never
figured in the decision of a reported case or any proceeding
against a lawyer from 1842 to 1938. This is probably because
there were no related enforcement provisions of any kind in
either the 1842 or 1912 Equity Rules. The post-1938 cases do offer
some insight on the meaning of good ground, but that is a dis-
cussion we must postpone for now.28 About the only reason-
ably certain observation we can make about the "good ground"
requirement Story fathered in Federal Equity practice is that
it was meant to secure lawyer honesty and was limited to that.
From this discussion of the rule's requirements, we can
identify six general ways to violate Rule 11. One can fail to
sign a pleading; the signature can fail to be in an individual
name; an address can be omitted; a party can sign pro se when
in fact represented by counsel within the meaning of the rule;
an attorney signing a pleading may not have read it; an attorney
may sign a pleading without "good ground" to support it. To pre-
vent such violations and obtain compliance with the requirements
of Rule 11, there must be effective enforcement procedures and
sanctions. It is in these sanction provisions that Rule 11 reveals
less than careful drafting. Clearly, what is appropriate to
ferreting out and disciplining the first three violations, which
are obvious from the face of the pleading, easily corrected, and
most likely the result of oversight, may not be appropriate to
the latter three, which are not often obvious, and, when under-
taken, are often undertaken for improper purposes. Yet not only
does the Rule fail to delineate different sanctions for the various
types of violations, but those sanctions that are expressly pro-
vided are both confused and confusing.
B. ENFoRcEmENT
The text of the rule provides that if a pleading is not signed,
or is signed "with intent to defeat the purpose" of the rule the
pleading "may be stricken as sham and false" and the action in
that event may proceed as if the pleading had not been served.
If the violation involves an attorney, and is "willful," the attorney
may be subject to "appropriate disciplinary sanction." The rule
then says that similar action (presumably disciplining an attor-
ney) may be taken if "scandalous" or "indecent" matter is in-
serted (presumably, in a pleading).
28. See notes 137-40 infra and accompanying text.
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The authority of the court to deal with omissions of address
or with signature in a firm name instead of in an individual name
is. not clearly set out. Perhaps a pleading signed in such a way
is not "signed" within the meaning of the Rule, but the court's
authority to deal with such a violation short of "striking it as
sham and false" is unclear. Every court that has ever faced the
issue has luckily had the good sense to find an implied power
both to order and to allow the technically offending pleading
to be corrected.29  Presumably, a refusal to correct such a
technical error would be ground to infer some sort of improper
motive and wilfulness in the original error, and perhaps justify
"striking" the pleading, but such a case would obviously be very
rare.
3 0
The hard cases are raised in exploring the court's authority
under the second clause, which appears to authorize striking a
pleading which is regular on its face as sham and false when
it has been signed with "intent to defeat the purpose of the
rule." It seems fairly clear that a pleading is signed "with intent
to defeat the purpose" of Rule 11 if it is "interposed for delay"
or does not have "good ground." And since the possible existence
of the former is dependent on the hbsence of the latter, as we
have already seen,3 1 the question of a violation by signature
which will trigger the enforcement mechanism turns on the
meaning of the term "good ground," a discussion which we must
once again postpone 2 except to note that it is a difficult concept
to define.
Perhaps it would be difficult to envision the ramifications
of any enforcement scheme based on such a nebulous standard
as the existence of "good ground," but the intended operation
of Rule 11 became even more confused when the drafters tied
the good ground requirement of pleading honesty to the sanc-
tion of "striking the pleading as sham and false." Nowhere in
the 1842 or 1912 Equity Rules is there any provision for a motion
to strike a pleading as sham, or as sham and false. No such motion
29. On the issue of omitted address, see, e.g., Miller v. Long, 152 F.2d
196, affg 71 F. Supp. 603 (E.D.S.C. 1945). As to failure to sign, see, e.g.,
Holley Coal Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 186 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1950);
Burak v. Comm. of Pa., 339 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Universal Labs.
Inc. v. Vivaudou Inc., 8 FED. R. SEav. 11.51, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
30. Indeed, the case seems never to have arisen, though Hummel
v. Wells Petroleum Co., 111 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1940), has overtones of
such a situation.
31. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
32. See text accompanying notes 170-85 inira,
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ever existed in equity practice, in the United States or in
England. The term "sham" was a specifically defined term of
art restricted to the law courts.3 3 Although the motion to strike
as sham was directed at attorney honesty, it also required a find-
ing of falsity in the challenged pleading, a practice consistent
with the right to have fact issues determined by a jury. As we
shall see, there has never been any mechanism to dispose of a
pleading on the ground of dishonesty before and independent of
a finding of falsity.34 Such a procedure in the federal courts
would be of dubious constitutionality in many cases since the
seventh amendment requires jury determination of the existence
or nonexistence of any -germane fact in civil actions descended
from, or analogous to, any action at common law.3 5 Yet on the
surface this appears to be the procedure intended under Rule
11. If to avoid those problems we say that what was intended
under Rule 11 was a procedure requiring findings both of
dishonesty and falsity, then the sanction of "striking" the plead-
ing seems superfluous, since any pleading that would qualify for
such "striking" would be a proper subject for summary judgment
under Rule 56.36 "Striking" seems to be of questionable pro-
priety either way. Yet therd the authorization seems to be.
The drafters apparently did not notice the problem created
by connecting the pure honesty standard of equity with the
honesty-falsity sanction of law practice. Nor did they notice the
anomoly that would arise if the honesty-falsity finding were
interpreted as part of Rule 11, in the face of the more sweeping
and flexible procedure for disposing of paper issues on the ground
of falsity alone under Rule 56. While these oversights leave the
enforcement provisions of Rule 11 ambiguous and perplexing
they are more understandable than one might initially presume,
given the historical context from which they arose.
33. The term "sham" as a term of art referred only to the motion
practice of the law courts. Groundless suits in equity had to await a
Master's hearing for disposition. See, e.g., Cockle v. Whiting, 1 Russ. &
M. 43, 29 Eng. Rep. 17 (Ch. 1829). This seems to have been the rule
virtually everywhere as long as law and equity practice were formally
divided. The single recorded exception seems to be Aubrey v. Aspinall,
Jacob 441, 37 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ch. 1822) where Chancery appears to follow
the law practice, which was then at its apogee. See text accompanying
notes 72-77 infra. The absence of any such motion may spring from the
fact that most chancery pleadings were required to be sworn as a matter
of course.
34. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
35. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
?6. See tpxt accompanying notes 96-104 infra.
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Part HI of this article sets forth that historical context. It
will show that the motion to strike a pleading as sham was a
surprisingly recent development in common law practice. It was
a tardy attempt to create some way short of an expensive trial
to eliminate pleadings which, though both untrue and dishonest,
created on their face a formally valid issue for trial. The motion
to strike as sham initially required determinations of both
falsity and dishonesty. It prepared the way for the creation of
modern summary judgment procedures by its ground-breaking
elimination of the requirement that all formally valid paper
issues (must proceed to trial). Indeed, by the elimination of the
requirement of a finding of dishonesty, some American jurisdic-
tions in the late 19th century converted the motion to strike as
sham into the first modern summary judgment procedure, al-
though it was generally available only to plaintiffs. It should
become clear, however, that since the common law motion to
strike as sham required determinations of both falsity and dis-
honesty to be successful, and modern summary judgment requires
only a determination of falsity, any motion to strike as sham
where summary judgment is available is either without any
practical function, or contemplates some undefined procedure
not related to the pre-statutory meaning of the words.
II. STRIKING AS SHAM IN THE LIGHT
OF HISTORY
A. ENGLISH DEVELOPMENT
The earliest reported reference to pleadings as "sham," found
in Anonymous, 2 Salk. 517, 91 Eng. Rep. 440 (K.B. 1697),
does not appear to refer to "sham" at all as that word came
to be defined as a term of art in the 1800's.3 7 During the 19th
37. The English system of justice was concerned with the problem
of dishonesty in lawsuits and the lawyer's role in it from an early point,
though often in a more or less desultory way. The famous Statute of
Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 29 (1275), made it a criminal offense for "any
Serjeant, Pleader, or other" to engage in "any manner of deceit or Collu-
sion in the King's Court, or to consent unto it in deceit of the Court,
or beguile the Court or a Party." The enforcement of the statute was
less than vigorous, though occasionally a court would find an attorney
(rarely a barrister) in violation, usually for practices that deprived the
king of fees, fines, or amercements. See, e.g., Jerome's Case, Cro. Car.
74, 79 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B. 1628) and cases cited in 4 E. CoKE, INsTI-
TUTEs 101 (1644). In 1567, Common Pleas used a special jury to investi-
gate "falsities, erasures, contempts and imprisions" by attorneys. 0.
SCHRomE , LAwYER DiscziPmL=; THE Ono STORY 2 (1967). Seventeenth
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century, both in England and America, the term sham meant
good in form but false in fact and dishonestly pleaded for some
unworthy purpose.38 Frivolous, on the other hand, meant
obviously false upon the face of a pleading, as when something
was pleaded that conflicted with a judicially noticeable fact
or was logically impossible, such as a plea of judgment recovered
before the accrual of the cause of action.3 9 In Anonymous the
terms are used together-"frivolous sham pleas"--and the major
thrust of the court's disapproval seems to be what was later
defined as "frivolity," for the court recommended as a remedy
a process of required review by counsel much like the chancery
practice previously discussed4" which would have had little
effect on "sham" pleadings as later defined. 4'
The common law seems to have been procedurally concerned
with dishonesty only in the case of defensive pleas. Indeed, as
we shall see, the term "sham" only applied to defensive plead-
ings. 42 This was not necessarily because the common law sys-
tem was plaintiff or creditor oriented,43 though this may have
century cases prior to Anonymous involving what would later be defined
as sham pleas included, inter alia, Pierce v. Blake, 2 Salk. 515, 91 Eng.
Rep. 439 (K.B. 1697) and Veale v. Warner, 1 Saund. 323, 85 Eng. Rep. 463
(K.B. 1670).
38. 1. J. CITTY, PLEADINGS 541 (1809); H. STEPHmN, TREATISE ON TH
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 442 (4th Amer. Ed. 1841).
39. For an early example, see Lamb v. Pratt, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 577
(K.B. 1822). The definition of "frivolous" is explicitly set out in Papi-
neau v. King, 10 M. & W. 216, 152 Eng. Rep. 448 (Exch. 1842). The dis-
tinction between sham and frivolous was generally observed in the
United States and England in the 19th and early 20th centuries. See,
e.g., Goodson v. Grierson, [1908] 1 K.B. 761; Baum v. Lincoln Highway
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 158 A. 467, 108 N.J.L. 534 (E. & A. 1932); Lefferts
v. Snediker, 1 Abb. Pr. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); Hull v. Smith, 8 How.
Pr. 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852). There were occasional anomalous cases,
of course; see, e.g., Lawrance v. Norreys, 15 App. Cas. 210 (1890).
40. See note 22 supra.
41. Anonymous is short enough for convenient reproduction here in
full. It sounds more like the promulgation of a directive than the deci-
sion of a case:
The Court resented the number of frivolous sham pleas which
came before them, saying, it was against the duty of counsel,
and against the Statute W. 1, c. 29, and that the old rule ought
to be revived, viz. that counsel should set their hands to the
books delivered to the Judges, which was anciently so ordered,
that the Court might not be troubled with frivolous pleas.
21 Salk. 517, 91 Eng. Rep. 440 (1697).
42. See notes 51-77 infra and accompanying text.
43. No such bias appeared, for example, in the statute, Westminster
I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 29 (1275), which reprobated attorney dishonesty generally.
See note 37 supra.
44. The distinction between fine and amercement was based upon
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been a factor. A more important factor may have been the effect
of the primary mechanism for obtaining honesty in litigation, the
system of fines and amercements.
The fines and amercements system reflects the common law's
failure to distinguish falsity and dishonesty in a very sophisti-
cated manner. The losing party to a lawsuit had to pay a sum
of money to the king for having been in the wrong before the
king's court. In some actions this money was called an amerce-
ment and in others it took the form of a fine.44 In either case
it was supposed to be flexible and just, fitting the severity of
the wrong in bringing or defending the suit.45 The private
litigant who brought a sham suit merely to harass his opponent
ran a high risk for his pleasure, and the actual danger of civil
"strike suits" therefore was probably not very great. However,
a defendant who was going to lose was going to be amerced or
fined in any event, and was likely to plead anything in order
to buy time.
The English legal system responded from time to time against
the dishonest affirmative defenses most popularly used for delay.
Thus, by the 17th century, the courts required "foreign pleas,"
that is, pleas that alleged occurrences or conditions outside the
jurisdiction of the court which would deprive it of jurisdiction,
to be sworn.46 Similarly, the statute, 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, § 11
(1706), required all pleas in abatement to be sworn. An unsworn
plea that was required to be sworn was a nullity, and the plain-
tiff merely signed judgment as if there had been a default.4 7 As
whether the court could fix the sum itself or had to resort to the process
of afeerment, that is, the fixing of the sum by two peers of the losing
party, as guaranteed in Magna Charta. The former was a fine, the latter
an anercement. A whole body of technical learning surrounded the sub-ject. In general, the power to fine depended on the power to arrest for
the offense implied in the loss, and it existed in regard to losing defend-
ants, and in some cases losing plaintiffs, in all those forms of action based
upon a protection of the king's peace, that is, trespass and its progeny,
as well as in some other actions. See generally 4 BACoN's ABRIDGEMENT
229 (7th ed. 1868); 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 511-14 (2d ed. 1898).
45. Theory and practice sometimes diverged, generally in favor of
the king's purse. It was such abuses that led to the insertion of the re-
quirement of afeerment of amercements in Magna Charta. See 1 W.
FINLASON, REEVE'S HIsTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 280 n.(a) (1800). By
the 18th century the toll seems to have been more or less regularized,
and complaints of excessiveness are uncommon.
46. See Dudeny v. Collyer, Style 226, 82 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B. 1650).
47. See CmTry, supra note 38, at 461-62; Pether v. Shelton, 1
Strange, 638, 93 Eng. Rep. 750 (K.B. 1738[?]) (the date is apparently
Michaelmas 12 Geo. I, though the first general heading of the section at
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no effect was given to such a plea there was no need for a motion
to strike it, and none was required. 48 If the plea did not fall into
a category required to be sworn, it created an issue no matter
how sham. Sworn or unsworn, it could not be disposed of short
of trial. And, of course, a plaintiff's declaration that was good
in form was likewise bound for trial regardless of falsity or hon-
esty.49 We do not come upon a mechanism to pierce a paper
issue which would otherwise go to -trial until the creation of the
motion to strike as sham, and this is not until the 19th century.50
By 1800 English pleading had grown into the snarled thicket
of technicalities which finally precipitated the reform movement
later in the century. Originally built upon the procrustean
requirement of a single issue,51 the system continued to pay
1 Strange 637 reads 11 Geo., a court term covered earlier at 1 Strange
606 et seq.).
48. Whether or not such a motion would even be accepted, and in
what circumstances, is a difficult question. Chitty maintains that one
had a right to proceed by motion as an alternative to signing judgment
directly, CnmTzy, supra note 38, at 462. This might have been useful in
cases where the plea was supported by an affidavit of questionable suffi-
ciency. To sign judgment wrongfully might have led to an award of
the costs of reopening. But the cases Chitty cites for his proposition do
not all bear him out. Far from sanctioning proceeding by motion, his
earliest citation, Pether v. Shelton, 93 Eng. Rep. 750 (K.B. 1738[?]), in-
dicates that the motion made in that case was superfluous and a question-
able practice. One case, Rex v. Grainger, 3 Burrows 1617, 97 Eng. Rep.
1010 (K.B. 1765), was a criminal case where judgment could obviously
not be signed directly and is no authority for the civil procedure. Two
King's Bench cases, Cunningham v. Johnson, 96 Eng. Rep. 788 (K.B.
1752), and Pearce v. Davy, 96 Eng. Rep. 884 (K.B. 1756), did allow
proceeding by rule in cases where a plea was sworn but the oath was
challenged as insufficient. As late as 1818, however, Common Pleas held
that no such motion practice was proper; the only mode of procedure
was to sign judgment even when questioning the sufficiency of an oath.
Bray v. Haller, 2 Moore 213 (C.P. 1818).
49. See Pierce v. Blake, 2 Salk. 515, 91 Eng. Rep. 439 (K.B. 1697).
The Pierce court appeared cognizant of its lack of any mechanism to
inquire into the falsity of a declaration prior to trial. Perhaps as a
result of an imprecise headnote to the opinion in this case, however,
Pierce has often been misconstrued to have involved some actual action
taken by the court to strike the pleading (Pogson, supra note 4, at 46 n.
21, where the date of Pierce is given incorrectly as 1822!) or to disci-
pline the attorney involved. (See the reference by Bayley, B., in Miley
v. Walls, 1 Dowl. 648 (C.P. 1833)).
50. There is a dictum reference to a possible earlier practice of
piercing a paper issue before trial in Hole v. Finch, 2 Wils 394, 95 Eng.
Rep. 880 (K.B. 1769), but there is no trace of its actual application.
Again, as in Anonymous, the practice may refer to what later came to
be known as frivolous, as opposed to sham, pleas. See note 37 supra
and accompanying text.
51. See generally B. SxwmiA, HADBooK or Co1mvmoN LAw P.EAD-
InxG 418 (3d ed. 1923).
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lip service to this hollow abstract ideal while for generations it
had been in the constant process of creating elaborate devices
to avoid it. These devices had the ill-fitting logic one would
expect a slow incremental process of self-delusion to generate,
and they provided a breeding ground for a convention of sham
defenses which threatened to become sanctified as accepted
fiction.
Originally, at common law, one could only join two counts
in a single writ and declaration if they were based on distinct
causes of action of the same form, for to allow two alternative
statements of the same cause of action would have resulted in
forbidden duplicity.52 By 1800 that rule had been eliminated
in deference to the reality that it is sometimes impossible to know
at the pleading stage exactly how things will develop at trial;
but in form each count still had to be framed to sound like it
was based on a different cause of action.53 Furthermore, orig-
inally only a single plea tendering a single issue was allowed.54
This rule was eventually relaxed to allow multiple pleading by
leave of court, and leave finally became obtainable virtually as a
matter of course.55 Since multiple counts were then permitted
on the same cause of action, but the formal fiction that each
count was a distinct cause was maintained, a plea to each count
was allowed as a matter of course. Apparently there was no
requirement that the pleas be viewed together for honest con-
sistency. By 1800 it had become common practice in the defense
of actions brought by creditors to put in dishonest pleas which
took advantage of this situation to the fullest extent possible. A
defendant's simplest course would have been to submit a false
denial, but for the debtor seeking either to buy time or escape his
debt altogether, the false denial was not as satisfactory a device
as the false affirmative plea. A denial joined issue, and trial
would then follow fairly quickly, while a false affirmative plea
made another round of pleading necessary. The existence of
uncarefully regulated multiple pleading meant that a skillful
attorney could frame a plea which would at worst take a long
time to respond to, and at best might provide a subtle trap into
52. Id. at 200-06.
53. This relaxation appears to have taken place at a very early date.
Id. at 204. As to the requirement that separate counts sound like sepa-
rate causes, see id. at 206.
54. Id. at 420.
55. The relaxation was embodied in the statute, 4 Anne, c. 16, § 4
(1706). See generally STEPnmN, supra note 38, at 421.
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which the plaintiff might fall, delaying things further, or possibly
even resulting in victory for the defendant on some technicality.
This practice seems to have become extremely common by 1800.
Unlike some other fictional pleadings within the system, however,
these pleas served no desirable function.
Lord Kenyon squarely faced up to the existence of this
Augean stable in Solomons v. Lyon5 6 in 1801. He strongly con-
demned the use of sham pleas. Unfortunately he had no very
good ideas as to what should be done about them. The plaintiff
in Solomons sued in assumpsit, and the defendant put in the
favorite sham plea of two set-offs, one upon a recognizance
alleged to be of record in the court of Exchequer, and the other
on a note. These set-offs tendered issues requiring two modes
of trial, the first by the record and the second by jury. The
plaintiff fell into the trap by filing a technically bad rejoinder
which "concluded to the country," that is, called only for jury
trial, to which the defendant demurred. The court allowed the
plaintiff to amend his rejoinder without costs, which were usually
imposed as a matter of course, "with an eye to discountenanc-
ing" sham pleas. But since the plea remained on the record, and
the defendant was the beneficiary at least of the desired delay,
similarly situated defendants and their attorneys were probably
not too discountenanced. Apparently the torrent of sham pleas
continued apace, for seven years later in Blewitt v. Mardsen,"
the court complained with
great indignation against the abuse which had grown up of
late and was continually increasing, of loading and degrading
the rolls of the court with sham pleas of this non-sensical na-
ture, making them vehicles of indecorous jesting; but which it
sometimes happened that the time of the court, which ought
to be better employed, and was sufficiently engaged with the
real business of the suitors, was taken up in a futile investiga-
tion of nice points which might arise on demurrer to such
sham pleas.5 8
The court further noted that there were "several other causes
wherein the same form of plea had been filed."59
The plea that drew this wrath was rather cute. Plaintiff
brought action as acceptor of a bill of exchange. Defendant
pleaded res judicata by a judgment previously recovered in the
the court of Piepoudre at Bartholomew Fair. The courts of
Piepoudre (dusty feet) were inferior courts originating in medi-
56. 1 East 369, 102 Eng. Rep. 143 (K.B. 1801).
57. 10 East 237, 103 Eng. Rep. 765 (K.B. 1808).
58. Id. at 238, 103 Eng. Rep. at 766.
59. Id.
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eval times which were convened at the various fairs of England
to try disputes arising from the dealings and misdealings at those
fairs.60 By 1808 they were of little importance, and of severely
restricted jurisdiction.0 1 The likelihood of anyone's litigating
over a bill of exchange there was almost zero, but a demurrer
to the plea would have been dangerous and potentially disas-
trous. It would have necessitated time-consuming examination of
the possible jurisdiction of that moribund court to see if such
litigation was theoretically possible. If the litigation proved to
be theoretically possible, a demurrer could result in judgment
for the defendant since the demurrer admitted the truth of the
allegations in the plea. And it was questionable whether the
issue of the impossibility of the plea was even litigable on
demurrer.0 2
Faced with this plea, the plaintiff's attorney took bold action.
Possibly influenced by the treatment afforded unsworn foreign
or dilatory pleas,63 he obtained a rule to the defendant to show
cause why the plea should not be disregarded, and plaintiff be
at liberty to sign judgment for want of a plea. The defendant,
in answering the rule, admitted the falsity of the plea. This is
important, because it saved the court from having to decide
whether a plea as unlikely as the one there involved could be
treated as false on its face, when there was a remote chance that
it might be true. The court then made the rule absolute (granted
plaintiff's motion) in the above quoted language.
In the same year as Blewitt v. Marsden there is a curious
case in the Court of Common Pleas, Charles v. Marsden.64
Whether they involved the same defendant does not appear.
Although the complained-of plea in that case was found proper,
the court alluded to some existing practice of generally requiring
pleas challenged as sham to be sworn. If such a practice existed,
60. 2 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT 789 (7th ed. 1868); 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
Comw=TAmiEs ch. 24 (4th Chase ed. 1914); T. PLUNKNETT, CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 590 (3d ed. 1940).
61. They were most certainly not merely fictitious or "jesters
courts" as Pogson mistakes. Pogson, supra note 4, at 49 n.26. They ad-
ministered the law merchant from a very early period and lasted into
the 19th century. See generally the very excellent discussion of their
jurisdiction in H. PoT=, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW
& ITS INSTITUTIONS 182 et seq. (3d ed. 1948).
62. The demurrer gave color to all averments in the declaration but
those contravened by judicially noticeable fact. See STEPHEN, supra note
38, at 282 et seq.
63. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
64. 1 Taunt. 224, 127 Eng. Rep. 818 (C.P. 1808).
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it was not only far ahead of its time, but it mysteriously vanished
without a trace, for no other discoverable cases make any refer-
ence to it. Two years later, faced with an ambiguous and tricky
plea, Common Pleas decided a rule to show cause why the plain-
tiff should not be allowed to sign judgment for want of a plea,
not by requiring verification by affidavit, but by allowing the
defendant to amend, a practice not calculated to discourage sham
pleas.65
The next important case in the development of the motion
to strike as sham was Penfold v. Hawkins (1814),66 an action of
debt on a bond. The plea, as in Solomons v. Lyon, was two set-
offs, one on the usual recognizance in the Exchequer, and one on
the money counts of assumpsit. The plaintiff here was even
bolder than the one in Blewitt v. Mardsen had been. He simply
treated the pleas as a nullity and signed judgment for want of a
plea. The defendant moved to set aside the judgment, and the
court refused, one judge referring to Blewitt v. Marsden without
further exposition. The court also found a fatal formal defect
in the plea, however, and this may have been the real reason
the judgment was permitted to stand. In other words, the plea
may have been judged a nullity not because it was sham but
because it was defective.
A similar attempt to graft the procedure applying to unsworn
foreign pleas onto sham pleas had been rebuffed in Common
Pleas two years earlier.67 The procedure must have seemed
theoretically out of kilter, and potentially disruptive, perhaps
leading to the necessity of verification of all affirmative pleas
without any supervision or interference by the court, which
would have been an unthinkable change in common law practice.
At any rate if Penfold does represent a successful attempt to sign
judgment directly against a sham plea without a motion,68 it is
the only one save one, Phillips v. Bruce,69 and that case arguably
65. White v. Howard, 3 Taunt. 339, 128 Eng. Rep. 135 (C.P. 1810).
66. 2 M. & S. 606, 105 Eng. Rep. 508 (K.B. 1814).
67. Thomas v. Smithies, 4 Taunt. 668, 128 Eng. Rep. (C.P. 1812).
68. As has been noted, the plea in Penfold was also technically bad,
and Chitty later argued that this was the true basis for the Penfold deci-
sion. Draycott v. Pilkington, 5 M. & S. 519, 105 Eng. Rep. 1141 (K.B.
1816) (a case Chitty himself reports sub nom. Drayest v. Pilkington in
note (a) of his report of Idle v. Crutch, 1 Chitty 524 (K.B. 1819)).
69. Phillips v. Bruce (K.B. 1817) is reported only in note (a),
Idle v. Crutch, 1 Chitty 524 (K.B. 1819). The-plea was res judicata by
a judgment recovered in the Irish Exchequer allegedly before the bills
upon which the action was based were even in existence. The defend-
ant's counsel objected to the procedure of direct signing of judgment,
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involved not a sham pleading but frivolity. Every other attempt
so to proceed was rebuffed,70 and the courts consciously re-
strained the practice of direct signing of judgment before it got
out of hand.
In 1815 the King's Bench decided a case,7 1 which represented
the wave of the future. The action was debt and the plea was
our old friend, two set-offs, one a recognizance in the Exchequer
and one on a bond. The plaintiff applied to set aside the plea,
and supported the application by his own affidavit of the falsity
of the plea. The defendant did not specifically admit that the
plea was sham, but refused to verify it, claiming its technical
propriety and the impropriety of the procedure attacking it. The
court called such sham pleas "novel devices" and set aside the
plea, allowing plaintiff to sign judgment. This is apparently the
first example in Anglo-American jurisprudence in which a form-
ally correct paper issue was disposed of on motion utilizing
extraneous proofs.
This was to become the standard method of attacking sham
pleas. Still, in 1815 there was no concrete indication of exactly
when the procedure could be invoked. Common law courts did
not generally like to carry novel procedures too far too fast. For
the next fifteen years or so the courts vacillated from case to
case as to just how far the procedure to set aside for sham could
be carried. The proper scope of the procedure was finally
defined very narrowly, just in time for the practice to fall into
disuse. As finally decided, a dishonest denial was not subject
to the procedure,72 nor was a single plea that bore no evidence
saying it was improper, and Lord EUenborough agreed generally, but
said,
[t~hat is where there is any doubt on the plea, and not where
it is clearly and distinctly on the face of it a sham plea, and
absurd, as this is. If sham pleas are used, they must not be new
and fantastic, and framed to deceive the parties who are to reply
to them. If pleaders wish to be as mischievous as their ances-
tors, they must be as dull; we must have no novelties.
See also Lamb v. Pratt, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 577 (K.B. 1822).
70. Anonymous (K.B. 1815), reported in note (a), Idle v. Crutch,
1 Chitty 524 (KB. 1819); Draycott v. Pilkington, 5 M. & S. 519, 105
Eng. Rep. 1141 (K.B. 1816); Duberly v. Phillips (K.B. 1816), reported
in note (a), Bones v. Bunter, 1 Chitty 564 (K.B. 1819); Bell v. Alex-
ander, 6 M. & S. 133, 105 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1817) (reported by Chitty
sub noma. Bill v. Alexander in note (a), Idle v. Crutch, supra).
71. Anonymous (K.B. 1815) reported in note (a), Bones v. Bun-
ter, 1 Chitty 564 (K.B. 1819).
72. This was because of the assumed right of defendant to put
plaintiff to his proof. See note 4 supra. The only qualification to this
was that a general denial might be struck if it was part of a dishonest
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of falsity on its face. (unless it was really a double plea
masquerading as a. single plea and containing some trick or
trap),74 nor-were any double pleas that were not tricky or at
least well known conventional shams (usually one and the same
thing).75 The procedure fell into disuse because the Hilary
Rules of 1834 contained provisions effectively curbing most of the
popular sham pleas.76  The summary procedure provisions of
185577 eliminated altogether the opportunity to use them in that
class of commercial cases to which they had been almost entirely
restricted. But the concept of the motion to strike as sham had
fallen on more fertile ground elsewhere.
B. THE AMERIcAN Movm
The term "strike" as applied to proceedings to rid the record
of sham pleadings was rarely used in English practice.78 It is
and tiicky double plea. Body v. Johnson (K.B. 1822), reported in
note (a), Shadwell v. Berthoud, 5 B. & Ald, 750, 106 Eng. Rep. 1365 (K.B.
1822); Corbett v. Powell (K.B. 1822), reported in note (a), Shadwell
v. Berthoud, supra.
73. Smith v. Backwell, 4 Bing. 512, 130 Eng. Rep. 865 (C.P. 1828);
Idle v. Crutch, 1 Chitty 524 (K.B. 1819). At one point it looked as if
the courts were moving towards allowing a general motion to strike sin-
gle pleas. See Shadwell v. Berthoud, 5 B. & Ald. 750, 106 Eng. Rep. 1365
(K.B. 1822) (also reported sub nom. Shadbolt v. Berthoud, 2 Chitty
355 (K.B. 1822), 1 D. & R. 446 (K.B. 1822)) (where the court stretches
to find a single plea tricky where it does not appear to be); Richley
v. Proone, 1 B. & C. 286, 107 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1823). Merington v.
Becket, 2 B. & C. 81 (K.B. 1823), put an end to this trend. Common
Pleas followed Merington in Young Gadderer, 1 Bing. 381 (C.P. 1823).
But see Vere v. Carden, 5 Bing. 413 (C.P. 1829), the report of which
is too short to tell exactly what happened. It may represent a frivolous
pleading like Lamb v. Pratt, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 577 (K.B. 1822).
74. Smith v. Hardy, 8 Bing. 435 (C.P. 1832).
75. Everett v. Wright (K.B. 1818) reported in note (a), Idle v.
Crutch, 1 Chitty 524 (K.B. 1819).
76. The Hilary Rules of 1834 made the most common sham plea,
judgment recovered, unavailable without marginal notation of the court
record involved. Reg. Pl. Hil., 4 Will. 4, c. I, § 8, enacted pursuant to
3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 1 (1833), reprinted in A. REPPY, INTRoDucTION TO
CIVIL PROcEDuRE 792 (1954).,
77. The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict.,
c. 67 (1855), covered most types of commercial cases which had given
rise to the reported attempts to strike for sham. See Bauman, The Ev-
olution of the Summary Judgment Procedure, 31 Iwn. L.J. 329, 334-342
(1956).
78. The only reported English case in which the term was used is
the relatively late Common Pleas case, Jones v. Studd, 4 Bing. 663, 130
Eng. Rep. 924 (C.P. 1828). Usually the courts spoke not of "striking"
defendant's plea, but of allowing plaintiff to sign judgment for want of
a plea.
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an American usage, applied to the procedure from its initial
appearance in American courts.7 9 The first American decisions
adopting the practice came from New York, and by mis-analysis
or design, took a comparatively broad view of the motion to strike
for sham. Thus, in the very early case of Brewster v. Hall,"°
the court said:
Thus it will be seen that the English cases do not entirely
agree, as to the kind of pleas which the court will strike out.
They do all agree that the plea must be without pretence in
point of fact; but when we come to its legal nature, we find
precedents for setting aside both those which are plainly good;
and others of a doubtful validity. Sometimes the criterion is
delay and expense; and sometimes ingenuity and delusion. In
truth, perhaps, no general rule can be laid down on the subject.
Courts have never yet set aside the general issue; but beyond
that, it seems to me, the matter must in a great measure rest in
sound discretion. The power to set aside sham pleas is now
well established. The great object is to prevent delay and
expense to the plaintiff; and consuming the time of the courts
in passing upon pleas which are a mere fiction, an unseemly
and expensive incumbrance upon the record, and a fraud upon
the rule which allows double pleading.8 1
This comparatively flexible and receptive attitude set the
tone for the American practice, and over the next decades, while
the English practice was falling into disuse, the American was
expanding. Between 1824 and 1848 the practice was apparently
restricted exclusively to New York. It was incorporated into the
Field Code of 1848 and the Code's successors as a codification of
the common law practice as it was then understood in New
York.8 2 As the code reform movement swept the country, the
provisions on the power to strike as sham went with it, and the
New York practice was generally followed elsewhere.
85
The practice of-striking pleas as sham, as it existed in Ameri-
can jurisdictions around 1870, had many of the earmarks of a
79. The language first appears in Steward v. Hotchkiss, 2 Cow. 634
(N.Y. 1824), the first recorded case of piercing a sham pleading in the
United States.
80. 6 Cow. 34 (N.Y. 1826) (decided in 1826 after the King's Bench
had already decided Merington v. Beckett, 2 B. & C. 8, 107 Eng. Rep.
313 (K.B. 1823), which signalled the retreat of the English courts from
the potentials of their practice with regard to sham pleas).
81. 6 Cow. at 36-37 (N.Y. 1826).
82. Section 152 of the N.Y. Code of Procedure of 1852 reflects the
final wording of this codification: "Sham and irrelevant answers and
defenses may be striken out on motion, and upon such terms as the court
may in their discretion impose." See generally Pogson, supra note 4,
at 58-68.
83. On the phenomenon of the spread and influence of the Field
Code, see generally CL~ARK, supra note 16, at ch. 1, § 8.
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nascent motion for summary judgment. It had the sine qua non,
the ability to pierce a well-pleaded paper issue. It was available
only in favor of plaintiffs,8 4 however, and it did not apply to
denials.8 5 An unsophisticated approach was often taken to the
form and use of extraneous proofs, leading to decisions that
cursorily verified pleadings could not be struck.8 6 Perhaps most
importantly, the usual definition of sham--"good in form but
false in fact and interposed for some unworthy purpose such as
delay"ST7-implied two findings. One was the falsity of the
pleading. This is of central importance to this Article, of course.
There is not one reported case prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules where a finding of falsity was not required before
a plea could be deemed sham. The second finding was the dis-
honesty of the pleader. Judges were understandably reluctant
to grant a motion that necessarily implied a finding that the
attorney involved was dishonest. Perhaps because of this, certain
jurisdictions began to de-emphasize the finding of dishonesty,
defining sham. as merely synonymous with "false in fact."88 But
not a single jurisdiction ever embraced any formulation of the
definition of sham which did not include the requirement of an
affirmative finding of the untruth of the challenged pleading. It
must also be borne in mind that this "finding" or conclusion of
falsity invariably had to be made in a manner that comported
84. Indiana provided the earliest (and until 1928, only) practice of
allowing a complaint to be attacked as sham. See Lowe v. Thompson,
86 Ind. 503 (1882); Stars v. Hammersmith, 67 N.E. 554 (App. Ct. Ind.
Div. 2 1903). Prior to the statute the Indiana courts had followed -the
usual rule. Indiana also provided for interrogatories but no other ex-
traneous proofs, to be used on the motion. Stars v. Hammersmith, supra.
85. See Pogson, supra note 4, at 79-80; cases collected at 49 CoRPus
Jmus Pleading § 994 n.73 (1930).
86. See cases collected at 49 C.J.S. Pleading § 995 n.83 (1930);
J. POMRoY, CODE RmWEDiEs § 561, at 914 (5th ed. 1929).
87. For various word formulas basically to the same effect, see cases
collected under the headings sham, sham answer, sham defense, sham
denial, sham matter, and sham plea, in WoRDs & PHRAsEs 196-207 (1953).
Some cases omit any reference to honesty in their formulas, even in
states where such omission was not customary, e.g., Howe v. Elwell, 57
App. Div. 357, 67 N.Y.S. 1108 (Sup. Ct. 1901), but none omit reference
to falsity.
88. See, e.g., State ex rel. Engelhard v. Webber, 96 Minn. 422, 105
N.W. 490 (1905); Goldberg v. Fisher, 11 N.J. Misc. 657, 168 A. 232 (Sup.
Ct. 1933). The courts of some states varied their word formulas from
time to time and place to place. Compare People v. McCumber, 18 N.Y.
315 (Ct. App. 1858) with Lefferts v. Snediker, 1 Abb. Pr. 41 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1854); Arata v. Tellurium Gold & Silver Mining Co., 65 Cal. 340, 4
P. 195, modified, 4 P. 344 (1884) with Continental Building & Loan
Ass'n v. Boggess, 145 Cal. 30, 78 P. 245 (1904).
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with the guaranty of jury trial which exists in the Federal
Constitution and in most state constitutions.8 9 In making a pre-
liminary finding of falsity the courts were restricted, then as now,
to the fairly stringent rules surrounding a court's power, not to
try issues, but to determine whether there were any issues to be
tried. This is one reason cursorily verified pleadings gave Ameri-
can courts such problems.9 0 Nevertheless, the motion to strike
as sham had a handy potential for evolution by judicial decision
which was almost realized in a few jurisdictions, most notably
New Jersey and Minnesota. New Jersey was the first jurisdiction
to allow the striking of denials in 1871,91 and Minnesota followed
in 1883.92 Both jurisdictions allowed verified pleadings to be
struck.9 3 More importantly, perhaps, Minnesota in 1905 specifi-
cally and emphatically abolished the requirement of a suggestion
or finding of bad faith on the part of the pleader,94 and the
Minnesota decisions did not restrict the availability of the motion
to any narrowly defined class of cases. From 1905 Minnesota
had, in the motion to strike as sham, a full blown modern sum-
mary judgment procedure available to plaintiffs, and it was prob-
ably the most functionally advanced such device in the English
speaking world until the 1930's.95
C. SUM ARY JUDGMENT
Since much of my position regarding Rule 11 is based upon
the historical and functional relationship between summary judg-
89. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3, and, e.g., VirNN. CoNsT. art. 1,
§ 4; N.J. CoNsT. art. 1, 1 9.
90. See generally Pogson, supra note 4, at 53-55.
91. Walter v. Walker, 35 N.J.L. 262 (Sup. Ct. 1871).
92. Hayward v. Grant, 13 Minn. 154 (1868).
North Carolina and Ohio also allowed denials to be struck. See
Flack v. Dawson, 69 N.C. 42 (1873); Werk v. Christie, 6 Ohio C. Dec.
255 (Hamilton Cir. Ct. 1895); Wentzel v. Zinn, 10 Ohio Dec. 97 (Hamilton
C.P. 1900). New York had an early flirtation with the practice in People
v. McCumber, 18 N.Y. 315 (Ct. App. 1858), but this position was repudi-
ated in Wayland v. Tysen, 45 N.Y. 281 (1871). See Pogson, supra note
4, at 67 and cases collected therein at n.95.
93. Coykendall v. Robinson, 39 N.J.L. 98 (1876); Nelson Lumber Co.
v. Richardson, 31 Minn. 267, 17 N.W. 388 (1883). The practice seems
to have been much more common in Minnesota. See cases collected at
49 CoRPus Jim's Pleading § 995 n.85 (1930).
94. State ex rel. Engelhard v. Webber, 96 Minn. 422, 105 N.W. 490
(1905).
95. One can only appreciate the sophistication of the Minnesota ap-
proach by an examination of such cases as Brown-Forman Co. v. Peter-
sen, 101 Minn. 53, 111 N.W. 733 (1907), and Bank of Richards v. Sheas-
green, 153 Minn. 363, 190 N.W. 484 (1922). New Jersey also seems to
have had an advanced approach.
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ment and the motion to strike as sham, the concept of summary
judgment should be discussed before proceeding further. Sum-
mary judgment is a mechanism for piercing allegations in the
pleadings by the examination of various extraneous proofs such
as documents and affidavits proffered by the parties, to determine
if there is in fact an issue which demands trial. Summary judg-
ment properly applied requires a detailed and sophisticated
examination of extraneous proofs to determine the existence of
an issue.96 It is a creation of the 20th century, and virtually
all the jurisprudence of summary judgment as a general mecha-
nism comes from the last forty-five years. True summary judg-
ment is not inherently concerned with honesty, for there can cer-
tainly be suits honestly brought and defenses honestly made
which nevertheless are proper subjects for summary judgment.
For example, as a third party beneficiary, I may sue an uncoop-
erative person for a contract violation with a quite honest and
reasonable belief in the legal propriety of the action, only
to have him produce documentary evidence available only to him
which conclusively establishes the existence of a defense. This
is not to say that summary judgment is not useful against dis-
honesty, but merely to recognize that much of its strength and
utility lies in the fact that it is not inherently concerned with
dishonesty.9 7
One defining characteristic of modern summary judgment is
the ability to eliminate a paper issue which would, but for this
mechanism, require trial. Judgments upon defaults and violation
96. See F. JAmES, Civm PRocEDuRE 230-36 (1965).
97. One should also distinguish between summary judgment as a
technical mechanism and a summary procedure. When the movement
to streamline civil procedure was gathering steam in the 1920's the two
terms were often used almost interchangeably, which can today cause
some confusion when examining the seminal articles in the area. A sum-
mary procedure is anything which cuts down on the procedural techni-
calities and inherent delays in an existing procedural system. It is
concerned, not with seeing whether there are issues to be tried, but with
cutting down the time, technicality, and expense at every stage of the
trial Summary judgment may be part of a process of summary pro-
cedure recommended for the reform in whole or part of an existing sys-
tem, but the two concepts are not the same. Many of the historical mate-
rials presented in Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil
Procedure, 38 YALE L.J. 193 (1928), and in Clark & Samenow, The Sum-
mary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 (1928), do not concern forerunners of
summary judgment as it is now conceived, except in the broad sense
that the desire for efficiency and simplicity in pleading and other areas
influenced the adoption of a summary judgment procedure also. See
also Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure, 31
IND. L.J. 329 (1956).
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of requirements that pleadings be verified by affidavit cannot be
regarded as very direct precursors of this main attribute of
modern summary judgment, because they result from rules
declaring that no paper issue has been joined, and their main
focus is not truth in fact. Default even in response to a false
declaration leads to judgment regardless of the actual truth of
the allegations in the pleading. No investigation of the assertions
is attempted, and though the law may be said to deem the alle-
gations true for purposes of the default, this has no necessary
relation to truth in fact. Similarly, to disregard an unsworn plea
may be to disregard a factually true plea, and the same obser-
vations apply mutatis mutandis as those made in the case of a
default. There may be some inference of falsity resulting from
failure to counter allegations vith a sworn denial, but the infer-
ence is not particularly strong.
Many point to the 1855 English Summary Procedure on Bills
of Exchange Act9 s as the precursor of modern summary judg-
ment.9 9 While it is true that the procedure influenced some
important aspects of the mechanism in some major functional
respects, it is not the antecedent it is assumed to be. In form,
it was an adaption of the procedures applied by the Statute of
Anne to dilatory pleas. As previously noted, that statute merely
made a plea in abatement ineffective unless verified by affi-
davit.10 0 The 1855 Act carried this concept one step further.
It applied to all substantive defenses in certain narrowly pre-
scribed types of cases-basically the same creditor actions which
had been the battleground of the courts and the sham pleaders
in the early part of the century.10 1 If the plaintiff was willing
to file an affidavit of merit in such a case, the defendant was
not allowed to plead as a matter of course. Rather, he needed
leave of court to defend and had to convince the court of the
existence of a triable issue in order to get it.102 It seems to
have been from this practice that detailed extraneous proofs came
to be tendered, accepted, and carefully inspected. The conclusory
98. 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67 (1855).
99. See, e.g., CLAnK, supra note 15, at 557; F. JAmES, CIVIL PROCE-
DuRE 233 (1965); C. WRIGHT, LAW or FEDERAL CoURTs 442 (2d ed. 1970);
and the Advisory Committee note to FED. R. Civ. P. 56 itself.
100. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
101. See Clark & Samenow, supra note 97, at 424, 430-31.
102. 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67, § 2 (1855). The defendant had one option,
posting security to cover the demanded judgment. See also Bauman,
supra note 97, at 339.
103. See, e.g., Wallingford v. Directors, etc., of the Mutual Society,
5 App. Cas. 685 (1880). See also Bauman, supra note 97, at 350-52.
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affidavit which might have escaped summary disposition under
earlier practices relating to sham pleadings was no longer
enough.103
The 1855 provisions and their successors performed no small
accomplishment in contributing a sophisticated approach to the
handling of extraneous proofs. But the 1855 provisions were at
odds with modem theory in important ways. First, they were
available only in favor of plaintiffs. More significantly, however,
they depended on a procedural model that made it virtually
impossible to extend the provisions to defendants. The model
was that of a pleading which remained ineffective or nonexistent
until the proponent of the pleading did something-that is, until
the defendant obtained leave to answer. It was during the pro-
ponent's attempt to obtain leave that the presence of an issue
was decided. Now try to turn the model around. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to think of a complaint being functionally
ineffective until leave of court is obtained. This would require
a hearing prior to the court's giving leave to file the complaint,
which would probably require notice to the defendant prior to
the filing. The notice would then begin to serve the purpose of
the original complaint, and the entire procedure would waste
judicial time. In short, the model used by the 1855 English pro-
visions was asymetrical; not only was summary judgment, so
called, accorded only to plaintiffs, but that was the only possi-
bility the procedural model afforded.104
In light of this background we see that it is difficult to over-
state the radical nature of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 when it was
promulgated in 1938. It was the third such provision to be made
generally available to defendants as well as plaintiffs, 0 5 and
the first to provide a simple procedure that could be used in all
types of cases without requiring inherent judgments concerning
the honesty of the case ultimately subject to summary judg-
ment.10 Its enactment rendered virtually meaningless any ref-
erence to any previously known procedure to strike as sham,
104. Note that this is not true of the motion to strike. A motion
can efficiently be accorded to both sides after the paper issue is joined.
This is one reason modern summary judgment provisions have aban-
doned the British form and returned to the form of the motion to strike,
that is, a speaking motion addressed to, and seeking to pierce, a pleading
adequate on paper.
105. New Jersey by statute made the motion to strike as sham avail-
able to defendants in 1928. 1928 N.J. Laws ch. 151. The Indiana prac-
tice has already been referred to, supra note 84.
106. See generally Bauman, supra note 97, at 352-55.
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since, as we have already seen, the concept of sham inevitably
required at least a finding of falsity without resolution of jury
issues. 107 Thus any pleading strikeable as sham prior to Rule
56 would be subject to summary judgment after the promulgation
of Rule 56.
What then do we make of the reference in Rule 11 author-
izing a court to strike a pleading as "sham" (and false, too)
when it is "signed with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule"
(that is, without good ground)? We have two alternatives. We
can say that the language is the product of less than careful draft-
ing and was never meant to authorize inquiring into honesty
before or independent of falsity. Prior to an attempt to deter-
mine the existence of a Rule 11 violation, then, there would have
to be a judicial finding of the falsity of the pleading challenged,
either through summary judgment, trial, or otherwise. This
makes sense functionally, but is hard to reconcile with the lan-
guage of the rule since it would seem possible to sign a factually
accurate pleading without "good ground." Or we can say that
the rule was intended to authorize an inquiry into the honesty
of a pleading prior to and independent of any inquiry into the
falsity of the pleading. This seems to square better with the lan-
guage of the rule (except for the troublesome phrase "and false"),
but it is objectionable on a number of grounds.
First, such a proceeding would violate the jury trial guaran-
tee, 08 since the court would not be performing the traditional
common law function of disposing of the case by finding that
there was no real triable issue, even though one appeared on the
face of the paper pleadings. 10 9 Second, administration of the
rule in this fashion could result in rather bizarre proceedings that
would only serve to foster delay and injustice, without providing
any benefit not provided by an initial determination of falsity
alone.
Most cases where the dishonesty of a pleading can be demon-
strated would seem to be proper subjects for summary judgment.
In the rare case where a court may be convinced that the plead-
ing was filed without good ground, even though the averments
might be true, we are faced with the possibility that the real
culprit might benefit, because even though the allegations were
107. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
108. US. CONST. amend. VII.
109. CLARK, supra note 16, at 564, and cases collected therein nn.
237-39.
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true, the pleader had no rational knowledge of the fact. It verges
on the absurd to have a procedure of questionable constitutional-
ity which could prove vexatious in practice to protect such
dubious beneficiaries from their opponent's dishonesty. Thus I
will take the position that it is never proper to have a Rule 11
inquiry prior to a final determination of falsity, which in the
normal case will occur either by trial or by summary judg-
ment. 10 This is not to say that it might not be proper in some
cases to dispose of Rule 11 contentions at the same time summary
judgment is given; that is, to consider falsity and honesty
together, and to determine the issue of honesty immediately after
finding falsity. It might be that certain violations are so obvious
at that point that they can be fairly dealt with immediately.
However, special proceedings directed toward Rule 11 questions
in advance of a normal determination of falsity' are at best
a waste of time, and the allowance of discovery directed only
toward such Rule 11 issues, such as depositions of a party's attor-
ney to determine what he knew and how he knew it when he
signed the complaint,"12 could perform no proper function, but
only serve to harass and raise serious questions concerning the
attorney-client privilege.
VI. RULE 11 IN PRACTICE
With the foregoing observations in mind, the question is, how
have the cases applied Rule 11? The answer is, not very often,
or very helpfully. Since the Rule was promulgated in 1938, there
have been only 23 reported cases where one party attempted to
have all or part of the opposing party's pleading stricken "as sham
110. Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F.
Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973), presented an abnormal case. See text ac-
companying notes 139-41 infra. The plaintiff had voluntarily discontin-
ued suit against the parties damaged by the Rule 11 violation. In such
a case the court must have a residual power to determine both falsity
and lack of good ground in order to protect persons from impositions
that would otherwise be shielded from scrutiny because of discontinu-
ances. No constitutional issue is present in such a case, as the proceed-
ings are ancillary to the suit in which the pleading has already been
voluntarily abandoned by the party.
111. Rule 11 does not by its terms authorize or refer to a right to
enforce it by motion. However, Rule 7(b) (1) directs that "an applica-
tion to the court for. an order shall be by motion .. . ," and since the
court must have some power to make orders to enforce Rule 11, and
since the Rule's purpose, at least in part, is to protect the opposing party,
he must have the right to make such a motion in an appropriate case.
The courts have generally accepted such motions. See cases cited in note
113 infra.
112. Such discovery has been allowed by courts. See Papilsky v.
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and false." 113  Four of these are early cases that are not per-
tinent since they were brought under another rule and do not
deal at all with Rule 11 or the problems we have been dis-
cussing.114  That leaves us with 19 genuine adversary Rule 11
motions. The first did not occur until 1950.115 Nearly half have
come since 1971.116 Seven have ended with more or less affir-
Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See
also Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1956).
113. Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1972); Ginsberg
v. Stern, 251 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932 (1958);
Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1956); Child v. Beame,
412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Acker v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 373
F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1974), modified, 512 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1975); Oren-
stein v. Compusamp Inc., 1974 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 96779 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp.
975 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8 (D.V.Is.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1924); In re Cope-
land, 350 F. Supp. 943 (D. Del. 1972); Heart Disease Research Foundation
v. General Motors Corp., 15 FED. R. SEav. 2d 11.41 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
on other grounds, 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Wells, 325
F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.
La. 1968); Brand v. Tisch, 253 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Freeman
v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D.
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Nichols v. Alcker, 126 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1954),
aff'd, 231 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956); AAA v.
Rothman, 101 F. Supp. 193, 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Intra
Mar Shipping (Cuba) S.A. v. John S. Emory & Co., Inc., 11 F.R.D. 284(S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Shuster, 11 F.R.D. 151 (D. Neb. 1950);
United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443 (D. Neb. 1950); Roosevelt Field Inc.
v. Town of North Hempstead, 84 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Yale
Transport Corp. v. Yellow Trucking & Coach Mfg. Co., 3 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.
N.Y. 1944); Thierfield v. Postman's Fifth Ave. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
114. Intra Mar Shipping (Cuba) S.A. v. John S. Emory & Co.,
11 F.R.D. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Roosevelt Field Inc. v. Town of North
Hempstead, 84 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Yale Transport Corp. v.
Yellow Trucking & Coach Mfg. Co., 3 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Thier-
field v. Postman's Fifth Ave. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
These cases were attempts to graft a procedure onto Rule 12 (f) by brute
force, whereby discrete allegations or parts of pleadings could be the
subject of partial summary judgment (that is, stricken as sham with
sham defined merely as falsity in fact), even though under the circum-
stances of the cases a full motion for summary judgment would not have
been in order to bring the partial summary judgment provisions of that
rule into play.
115. United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443 (D. Neb. 1950).
116. Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1972); Child v.
Beame, 416 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Orenstein v. Compusamp Inc.,
1974 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 96779 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Acker v. Provident
Nat'l Bank, 373 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Econo-Car Int'l,
Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8 (D.V.Is. 1973), rev'd on
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mative findings of no violation,11 7 while three others have
avoided the issue by decisions on other grounds." 8 In nine
cases violations have been found." 9 In addition, Rule 11 viola-
tions have been found by the court sua sponte in two other
cases.' 20  Of these 11 cases resulting in findings of violation,
other grounds, 499 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1974); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D.
95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Copeland, 350 F. Supp. 943 (D. Del. 1972);
Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., FED. R.SEav. 2d 11.41 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir.
1972); Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
117. Lan Ah Yew v. Dules, 236 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1956); Child v.Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Orenstein v. Compusamp Inc.,
1974 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 96779 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Papilsky v. Berndt,
59 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); United States v. Shuster, 11 F.R.D. 151 (D. Neb. 1950); United
States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443 (D. Neb. 1950). The opinions in Long, Shu-
ster, and Papilsky tend to indicate some suspicion on the respective
courts' part that an intensive inquiry directed toward striking the plead-
ing on Rule 11 grounds might be improper.
118. Acker v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 373 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1974)(case disposed of on summary judgment); In re Copeland, 350 F. Supp.
943 (D. Del. 1972) (refusal to disturb bankruptcy referee's discretion);
Ginsburg v. Stern, 148 F. Supp. 663 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (case disposed of
for failure to state a claim). The Ginsburg case is a little strange, be-
cause the court eschews any formal decision on the Rule 11 issue, but
then makes some grumpy comments which come suspiciously close to
a Rule 11 finding against the plaintiff, who was an attorney representing
himself. (That is not the only strange thing about the case. The plain-
tiff was suing a large percentage of the state judiciary of Pennsylvania,
including every member of its supreme court, for conspiracy to deprive
him of his civil rights). Ginsburg is surprisingly similar both in subject
and tone to Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. La. 1968), another
very strange opinion wherein the court, inter alia, concluded that an
amended pleading was ineffective because filed without leave of court,
and then went on to strike it anyway.
119. Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1972); Kinee v.
Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8(D.V.Is. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1974);
Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 15 FED.
R. SEarv. 2d 11.41 (S.D.N.Y.); aff'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 98 (2d
Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Spencer
v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. La. 1968); Freeman v. Kirby, 27
F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Nichols v. Alker, 126 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.
N.Y. 1954), aft'd, 231 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1956); AAA v. Rothman, 101 F.
Supp. 193, 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
120. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bill's Farm Center, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 114 (W.D.
Mo. 1970), afi'd, 449 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1971); In re Lavine, 126 F. Supp.39 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd sub nom. In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc'y,
217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954). City of Kingsport v. Steel & Roof Structure,
Inc., 500 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1974), may be another such case. In reversing
the lower court, the court of appeals indicated that Rule 11 was an alter-
native ground for the lower court's disposition, but the lower court
opinion is unreported. 500 F.2d at 619. The lower court's disposition
seems to have been based less on a finding of dishonesty than on a mis-
taken notion concerning the availability of alternative and inconsistent
theories in federal practice. See note 16 supra.
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four were disposed of on other sufficient grounds so that the pro-
priety of the alternative ground of "striking the pleading" was
not readily testable on appeal.12 1  Of the remaining seven
cases, no disciplinary action was taken against offending counsel
in two1 22 and alternative sanctions were imposed on the attor-
neys involved in three.1 23 One case of "striking" was reversed
on appeal 2 4 and one case was ultimately successful.125
121. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8(D.V.Is. 1973); Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors
Corp., 15 FED. R. SERv. 2d 11.41 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds,
463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972); Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531 (W.D.
La. 1968); Nichols v. Alker, 126 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
122. Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Bil's Farm Center, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 114 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
123. Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp.
975 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (attorneys made to pay personally all expenses occa-
sioned by violation including attorney's fees); In re Lavine, 126 F. Supp.
39 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (attorney initially disbarred but the disbarment was
reversed on appeal for failure to give minimal due process in determina-
tion to disbar, sub nom. In re Los Angeles Pioneer Society, 217 F.2d 190
(9th Cir. 1954)); AAA v. Rothman, 101 F. Supp. 193, 104 F. Supp. 655
(E.D.N.Y. 1952) (case disposed of on summary judgment; the attorney's
name was indexed for easy reference, in case he got in trouble again!?!
The effectiveness of such a sanction is doubtful.).
124. Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1972). Bertucelli
is a strange case. It was a civil rights action by a prisoner who did
happen to be represented by counsel. One of the many theories for relief
involved an allegation that the warrant under which he was arrested
was unsigned. The district court found that, since the warrant was on
file in the state court and was signed, the allegation of lack of signature
was a violation of Rule 11 (probably on a "duty of investigation" theory,
see text accompanying note 182 infra). The district court then struck
or dismissed the complaint on the alternative grounds of Rule 11 viola-
tion and violation of the Rule 8(a) strictures against prolixity. The
court of appeals claimed to agree with the finding of a Rule 11 violation,
but reversed the district court, remanding to allow an amendment that
could only remedy the prolixity. Thus the final posture of the case was
that no action was taken on what was found to be a Rule 11 violation.
Note that this case is essentially different from Lau Ah Yew v. Dulles,
236 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1956), where the district court's implied finding
of a Rule 11 violation was reversed on appeal
125. Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (motion to
strike granted at trial; the case was not heard on appeal). See text ac-
companying notes 130-36 infra. One state court has granted an adver-
sary motion to strike based upon a state version of Rule 11. Halpern
v. Barran, 272 A.2d 118 (Del. Ch. 1970). Halpern was an adversary Rule
11 challenge concerning the propriety of a stockholder's derivative suit
in which the court took the position of Freeman v. Kirby concerning the
proper administration of the rule. Most of the criticisms of Freeman (see
text accompanying notes 130-39 infra) can be applied to the reasoning
of Halpern as well. The one extra wrinkle in Halpern is that the court
claimed to decide that the attorneys involved did not have good ground
for the complaint, but specifically found that they had acted honestly
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No court faced with a Rule 11 motion has ever simply
rejected it as being inappropriate when made prior to a finding
of falsity by the regular modes, though some have expressed a
certain queasiness at the implications of the procedure. 12
Even the Supreme Court of the United States was uneasy when
faced with an analogous procedure under Rule 23.1, in Surowitz
v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 27 Rule 23.1 retained the code type
requirement of verification in stockholder derivative suits, osten-
sibly to prevent strike suits. The district court in Surowitz
forced the plaintiff, the aged immigrant mother-in-law of a
securities lawyer who had advised her in filing the suit, to
undergo detailed examination on the intricacies of the securities
act complaint filed in her name. No one seemed to be concerned
with whether the allegations made were true. The district court
found that her knowledge was insufficient to allow her to
verify the complaint and dismissed, and the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed.' 28  The Supreme Court reversed, through Mr. Justice
Black. The Court held, on the only issue properly before it, that
one could properly verify a pleading based on information and
belief obtained from trusted advisors; however, the Court showed
great doubt about the procedures followed below:
and in good faith. 272 A.2d at 124 n.4. Even in the face of its finding
of honesty, the court struck the complaint without a determination of
the falsity of the allegations. The court apparently did not believe that
one proper function of a civil action is the use of discovery to investigate
reasonable suspicion, or, perhaps, decided that although reasonable men
could reach different conclusions, plaintiff's suspicion was not, in fact,
reasonable. That Rule 11 should be the vehicle by which such a case
is ended seems dubious. Striking the complaint under such circum-
stances is far afield from the rule's raison d'etre of ensuring honesty in
pleading. The case should have been allowed to go at least to a normal
summary judgment.
126. The approach adopted by the court in its almost summary res-
olutions of the Rule 11 challenges in United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D.
443 (D. Neb. 1950), and United States v. Shuster, 11 F.R.D. 151 (D. Neb.
1950), appears to have been the product of some uneasiness with the pro-
cedure, at least in part. The court in Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), expressed doubts about the propriety of the procedure,
though it allowed discovery and resolved the Rule 11 challenge on the
merits.
127. 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
128. 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965). The circuit court held that the
district court had properly concluded that the complaint was a "sham."
342 F.2d at 607. On the issue of procedure, the court concluded that
there was an "inherent power to dismiss this complaint." 342 F.2d at
608. The suggestion in Note, Verification as a Safeguard Against Abuse
of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1966), that
FED. R. Civ. P. 41 provides a basis for dismissal does not speak to the
anomaly of judging honesty before falsity.
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We assume it may be possible that there can be circum-
stances under which a district court could stop all proceedings
in a derivative cause of action, relieve the defendants from
filing an answer to charges of fraud, and conduct a pre-trial
investigation to determine whether the plaintiff had falsely
sworn either that the facts alleged in the complaint were true
or that he had information which led him to believe they were
true. And conceivably such a pre-trial investigation might
possibly reveal facts surrounding the verification of the com-
plaint which could justify dismissal of the complaint with prej-
udice. However, here we need not consider the question of
whether, if ever, Federal Rule 3(b) might call for such sum-
mary action. Certainly it cannot justify the court's summary
dismissal in this case.' 29
"[M]ay be possible"; "conceivably ... might possibly"[!];
"whether, if ever"-it is difficult to imagine language more quali-
fied by doubt, or with better reason, as an examination of the
one successful pure Rule 11 challenge will illustrate.
The facts of the one successful Rule 11 case are somewhat
complex. There was once a corporation called Allegheny Cor-
poration, controlled by a man named Kirby.130 Some internal
hanky-panky occurred and two groups of stockholders sued the
officers and directors on behalf of the corporation, one in state
court in New York, and one in federal court. Clint Murchison
(of fame and fortune) and Kirby were defendants in both actions
(along with some others). A settlement of both suits was accom-
plished in December, 1959. Later investigation by Murchison,
however, suggested that Kirby had procured the settlement by
making a secret deal, hostile to the interests of Allegheny, with
one of the plaintiffs, and Murchison contemplated suing on the
corporation's behalf to rescind Kirby's settlement.
During the course of his investigation, Murchison was con-
tacted by Jesse Holland, a lawyer who, although he had no appar-
ent ownership interest in Allegheny, had examined the Kirby
settlement, found it fishy, and decided to sue. He had one of
his clients, an Allegheny stockholder, procure two other stock-
holders to act as plaintiffs. When Holland met with Murchison's
legal advisor he was shown all the documents and reports
developed in the Murchison investigation up to that time. Appar-
ently Murchison wanted to encourage a two front war against
the defendants, because he also seems to have agreed to pay
Holland's litigation expenses. Holland apparently based the com-
129. 383 U.S. at 371.
130. The narrative that follows was constructed by distilling and
combining the information given in Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) and Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
1976]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
plaint in his lawsuit (Freeman v. Kirby)13 1 on the draft com-
plaint prepared by Murchison's lawyers, Townley, Updike, Carter
and Rogers, for the Murchison suit (Murchison v. Kirby) .132
The complaints in both Freeman and Murchison were filed
on the same day. The defendants in both actions were the same,
and they moved in each action, inter alia, to strike the complaint
for violation of Rule 11.133 The Murchison motions came on first
before Judge Weinfeld. At the argument, the plaintiffs' attorneys
assured the court that they had spent a great deal of time investi-
gating the allegations, and the court ruled that no violation had
been shown. 13 4 The court was obviously sensitive to the need
for a finding of falsity in fact, and disturbed by the attempt to
inquire into good ground prior to a finding of falsity, taking a
finding of falsity to be a sine qua non of a successful motion
to strike as sham.13 5 The implications of such a holding in light
of Rule 56 were not explored.
The Freeman motions came on three months later before
Judge Bicks. At that Rule 11 hearing, Townley, Updike, Carter
and Rogers testified that in their professional opinion the infor-
mation they had on September 1, 1960 was not sufficient ground
to commence the suit, and it was not until at least September
7, after Holland's complaint had been prepared, that they ob-
tained that ground. They did not say what new information had
made the difference. Although the basic facts upon which both
the Freeman and Murchison complaints were based were the
same, Judge Bicks struck the Freeman complaint as lacking good
ground. 136 This action could have been taken only upon a find-
ing of dishonest pleading, since no effort was made to determine
the truth of the allegations.
131. 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
132. 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
133. There was a challenge to Murchison's Rule 23 verification which
presaged that in Surowitz (see text accompanying notes 127-29 supra),
except that Murchison spoke more English than Mrs. Surowitz. The
court denied it, holding that hired investigators may be relied on in a
verification. (It should be noted that the court seems to have allowed,
or the plaintiffs not to have challenged, discovery for the purposes of
attacking the basis of verification.)
134. Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.RD. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
135. The court stated: "A pleading should be stricken only when it
appears beyond peradventure that it is sham and false and that its alle-
gations are devoid of factual basis; otherwise it would deprive a party
of his right to a trial of the issues posed by his complaint-it would
mean trial by affidavits." Id. at 19.
136. Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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This case has certainly gone a long way toward making a
hash out of the jurisprudence of Rule 11. In it we find inquiry
into ground before and regardless of falsity, a very grudging
standard of what constitutes good ground, an assumption of the
power to strike for Rule 11 violations regardless of falsity, and
an exercise of that assumed power. To be fair, there were many
reasons to try to eliminate the Freeman complaint. The plaintiffs
had been solicited, not to vindicate their rights, but to set up mul-
tiple litigation for tactical reasons and, perhaps, to multiply
recoverable attorney's fees. Not only were the plaintiffs in Free-
man not paying, but litigation expenses in both cases were ulti-
mately to come from the same source. All these things raise seri-
ous ethical questions, and eliminating Freeman hurt no one, since
the rights of the company derivatively asserted in both suits
could be vindicated in Murchison. Dismissing the complaint
actually did little but deprive Murchison of two days in court.
A reading of Judge Bicks' opinion strongly implies that these
were the real reasons for striking the complaint, but, obviously,
none of these considerations have anything to do with Rule 11.
To reach a desired result the case stretched the rule beyond
recognition. 137
What seems improper about Holland's conduct is not that he
lacked sufficient knowledge to support the allegations of his com-
plaint, but that his plaintiff was not really interested in pursuing
the litigation. If the situation in Freeman called for some judicial
action, that action should not have been taken under the banner
of Rule 11. Rule 11 is not a catchall provision for professional
ethics, and, in any event, it appears that pleading was one of the
few things that Freeman's attorney did properly. There is ample
inherent power in the court to deal appropriately with a case
like Freeman v. Kirby without muddying the, jurisprudence of
Rule 11.138 Indeed, if we accept the position that the "strike
as sham" provisions of the rule should not be read to authorize
inquiry into the presence of good ground- before the normal
137. This seems to have been the main basis for criticizing the case
adopted in Recent Decisions, Federal Procedure,, 47 VA. L. REv. 1434
(1961).
138. Less drastic alternatives appropriate to these circumstances
might have been a requirement that Holland withdraw (as he seems to
have done by the time the Rule 11 challenge was argued), discipline
against Holland, and refusal to award costs or attorney's fees for multi-
plied proceedings should plaintiffs prevail. Striking the complaint did
not have as severe implications in Freeman as in the usual case, since,
as noted in the text accompanying note 137 supra, the corporation's rights
could still be fully vindicated in the pending Murchison litigation.
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inquiry into falsity, these inherent powers become the most
logical and most effective means of enforcing the rule, as we will
see by examining the approach taken in another case, Kinee v.
Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings and Loan Association.'39
V. AN AVAILABLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ALTERNATIVE TO STRIKING PLEADINGS
IN TIE ENFORCEMENT OF RULE 11
In Kinee, a group of mortgage borrowers sued some 177
banks. The plaintiffs had been forced by the terms of their mort-
gage agreement to put up money to cover potential tax liabilities
on the property subject to the mortgage. These monies were held
by the mortgagee in non-interest bearing escrow. The main
thrust of the complaint was that there had been a conspiracy
among mortgage-lending institutions to eliminate interest bearing
escrow accounts as a point of competition in violation of the anti-
trust laws. Before any significant pretrial actions were taken,
the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed 46 defendants from the action.
The remaining defendants moved, among other things, to strike
the complaint for violation of Rule 11. In the course of consider-
ing this motion the court (Judge Clarence Newcomer) discovered
that there had indeed been a Rule 11 violation, but that the
remaining defendants had not been affected by it. The court
found that the plaintiffs and their attorneys had sufficient
ground to plead the alleged conspiracy, but that the attorneys,
rather than investigating who the potential members of the
conspiracy were-mortgage lenders who did not offer interest
bearing tax escrow accounts-had taken the shortcut of suing
everyone listed under "mortgages" in the Philadelphia phone
book. Then they simply waited for those persons who had
nothing to do with the subject matter of the complaint, such as
mortgage finding agents, to identify themselves, whereupon the
attorneys voluntarily released them from the dragnet and dis-
missed them from the case. The court recognized that striking
the complaint for the violation would not be appropriate. The
court also realized, however, that a number of parties had been
unfairly subjected to inconvenience and expense because of the
violation.14 The court did the most logical thing. It made the
139. 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
140. The essence of the violation was that being listed in the phone
book did not indicate membership in the conspiracy-hence the com-
plaint lacked good ground. Note, however, that as a result of bringing
the suit, the plaintiffs and their attorneys did have good ground to sup-
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responsible persons, the plaintiffs' attorneys, personally pay the
expenses incurred by the voluntarily-dismissed defendants.
There is much to recommend Judge Newcomer's solution as
a general approach for handling Rule 11 violations. It fastens
upon the offending attorney the obligation to fully compensate
those who have been put out of pocket by his misconduct. At
the same time, it creates no windfalls and eliminates the risk of
penalizing an innocent client by striking the complaint when the
misconduct is solely the attorney's. Further, the penalty or
deterrent value of such action is significant, whether taken just
after pleadings are filed, or after dismissal, summary judgment,
or trial. Therefore, this procedure could be used even though
inquiry into the question of pleading honesty is put off, as it
should be, until after the normal determination of falsity has
been made, or at least until it is certain that a normal determina-
tion of truth or falsity will not be made. Finally and perhaps
most importantly, this approach ensures that no person will
suffer financial loss because of demonstrable attorney misconduct
in the courts.
There may be situations in which it is difficult to prove that
a Rule 11 violation has put anyone out of pocket. If a single
count of a multi-count indictment were the locus of the violation,
determining expenses attributable to it might be difficult, and
such expenses might be too small to have any deterrent effect.
Award of expenses, however, is not the sole potential sanction
for a Rule 11 violation. Punitive fine or imprisonment through
the contempt power, formal reprimand by the court, or even dis-
barment might all be available sanctions within the meaning of
other "appropriate disciplinary action," although that language
in Rule 11 should not be read to authorize imposition of these
sanctions without the procedural rights ordinarily accompanying
such actions.141
port new or continued allegations that the remaining defendants were
members of the alleged conspiracy.
141. For a general discussion of the due process requirement of a
contempt determination, see N. DoasEN & L. FRISDmAN, DisoRmm iN
THE COURT 218-39 (1973). See also note 150 infra. For a discus-
sion of the limitations on the courts' contempt and disbarment powers
in a Rule 11 context, see In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc'y, 217
F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954). Some caution is in order in relying on this
opinion, however, as it does not distinguish between the contempt power
and other sources of supervisory power over attorneys. See note 153
infra. For an example of a formal reprimand, see AAA v. Rothman,
101 F. Supp. 193, 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
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One might argue that the courts lack authority to make
attorneys pay anything for violating Rule 11, or at least lack
authority to make them pay expenses above statutory costs
(which rarely include attorney's fees), or that, at the very least,
a jury trial is required.142 Anglo-American courts, however,
have historically been involved in various ways in disciplining
members of the legal profession. English judges very early
asserted an inherent power to order attorneys or barristers to
make compensatory payments to anyone aggrieved by misconduct
arising from and affecting the course of a particular case before
a court.148 These orders were independent of the contempt
power, with contempt reserved as a sanction for violating the
order,144 and they were of necessity post-trial. 45
After falsity had been established by trial or otherwise, a
number of actions against an offending lawyer were open to the
aggrieved party. Obviously he could sue independently for
142. The appellate history of the Kinee case offers no help with these
questions. The plaintiff's attorneys attempted an appeal on the Rule 11
issues. They correctly viewed the district court's order of fees as final
under the authority of Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United States Dist. Court v. Mahoney,
371 U.S. 888 (1962), but they captioned the appeal only with the party
names, i.e. Kinee, et al. The court of appeals dismissed the case in a
one line, unreported opinion, on the ground that the named appellants
had no standing. No. 74-1458 (3d Cir. July 5, 1974). The attorneys'
petition for rehearing en banc or for permission to insert their own names
into the caption was denied. No. 74-1458 (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974). Since the time to take an independent ap-
peal in their own names had run, they were denied any review of the
substance of the lower court decision. The total costs imposed, inciden-
tally, were in excess of $15,000.
143. Hickman v. Clarke, (Ex. 1615), reprinted in 2 FowLERs Ex-
CHEQUER PRAcTIcE 478 (1795), is an early illustration of the power.
Defendant's counsel signed a frivolous and scandalous answer (bad on
its face, not sham) which was struck out of the file and defaced, and
the counsel was made to pay plaintiff 20 nobles costs. In Aubrey v.
Aspinall, Jacob 441, 37 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1822), the one equity "sham
plea" case, the costs were imposed upon the solocitor who filed the
plea. In Vincent v. Groome, 1 Chitty 182 (K.B. 1819), the attorney was
made to pay the costs occasioned by the sham plea. See also Thomas
v. Vandermoolen, 2 B. & A. 197, 106 Eng. Rep. 339 (K.B. 1818); Clarke
and Another, Executors of Lennard v. Gorman, 3 Taunt. 492, 128 Eng.
Rep. 195 (K.B. 1811); Rolfe v. Rogers, 4 Taunt. 191, 128 Eng. Rep. 302
(K.B. 1811).
144. See generally A. PumLNG, SuMnvrAy OF THE LAw A) PRACTICE
RELATnG TO ATToRNEYS 44 et seq. (3d ed. supra 1862), and note 143
supra.
145. Indeed, one of the court's laments in the often misconstrued case
of Pierce v. Blake, 2 Salk. 515, 91 Eng. Rep. 439 (K.B. 1697) (see note
49 supra), was that there was nothing it could do to inquire into false
pleadings until trial or into lawyer dishonesty until after trial
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deceit.' 46 The disadvantages of electing such a course included
delay and the technical difficulties of satisfying the burden of
persuasion, with the attendant risks of a possibly expensive defeat
inherent in any jury trial. If the party wished to avoid a lawsuit
he could appeal to the court that originally heard the case in
which the misconduct occurred by using what came to be known
as a summary application.147 Alternatively, the party could ask
the court to cite the offending lawyer for contempt. 48 A
sunimary application could perhaps ultimately result in a law-
yer's being held in contempt, but the basic distinction between
the two proceedings and their underlying theoretical sources of
power is important. 49
A contempt of court is a misdeed by any person which under-
mines the legitimacy or effectiveness of the court. A contempt
is a crime, and may be punished by, inter alia, fine or imprison-
ment. For this reason the Supreme Court has wisely held that
the normal procedural safeguards applicable to crimes, including
the jury trial guarantee, may apply to serious cases of con-
tempt. 10 The theory underlying orders under a summary
application was different and no comparable reasons exist for
applying any but minimal due process safeguards. The court was
exercising its inherent supervisory power over its own "officers"
or over the lawyers who had the special privilege of practicing
before it.' The court felt a special responsibility to ensure
that no one was damaged because of the professional misconduct
of lawyers, whose close association with the court itself provided
opportunities for mischief in their professional capacity. Any
146. See 4 E. CoKE, INsTrrurss 102 (1644); PULLING, supra note 144,
at 419. See also Whitmore v. Mackeson, 16 Beav. 126, 51 Eng. Rep. 725
(Ch. 1852). For a modern analogue, see Berlin v. Nathan, Docket No.
75L-16838, July 1, 1976 (Cook County Court, Ill.) (reported in New York
Times, July 3, 1976, § 1 at 20, col 1 (late city ed.)).
147. PULiNaG, supra note 144, at 433.
148. A contempt proceeding was begun by attachment and was in
theory purely punitive. See, e.g., Wright v. Mason, 8 Mod. 109, 88 Eng.
Rep. 86 (K.B. 1723).
149. The distinction is best illustrated by comparing Wright v. Ma-
son, 8 Mod. 109, 88 Eng. Rep. 86 (K.B. 1723), a pure contempt case, with
Gynn v. Kirby, 1 Strange 402, 93 Eng. Rep. 594 (K.B. 1721), where the
attorney was ordered to pay costs on summary application, and in de-
fault of payment was proceeded against for contempt. See also Coxe
v. Phillips, Cas. T. Hard. 238, 95 Eng. Rep. 152 (K.B. 1735).
150. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (jury trial);
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (requirement of differentjudge). See also Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See
generally DoRsErN & FRmmAN, supra note 141, at 218-39.
151. PuLmnwG, supra note 144, at 419 et seq.
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misfeasance, including dishonest pleading, could be the subject
of a summary application ancillary to the proceeding in which
the misfeasance took place. The authority under the summary
application, however, was not punitive or penal; often the mis-
feasance complained of might be the result of negligence. 152
The theory was compensatory, though like all compensatory
actions it carried with it elements of disapproval and deterrence.
A dishonest pleading might be both a contempt and a proper sub-
ject for a summary application, but the two were never manifes-
tations of the same theory of power, as some courts have mis-
takenly concluded. 153 A proceeding by summary application is
better analogized, for due process purposes, to proceedings where
money might be lost, that is, to civil proceedings, 15 4 and it was
a proceeding to which no right of jury trial attached at common
law.
One can argue that proceedings of the summary application
type and effect, like that utilized in Kinee, for example, are
authorized by the "appropriate disciplinary action" language of
Rule 11 itself, although the result of such action is as much com-
pensatory as disciplinary. But even absent this argument, I
incline toward the position that, given the historical precedents,
the power to utilize such summary proceedings is inherent in the
concept of judicial power in Anglo-American legal systems' 55
and is possessed by any court of general judicial power,
152. For a negligence-based exercise of the power, see, e.g., Pitt v.
Yalden, 4 Burr. 2061, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767). By the 19th century,
the courts asserted summary power to enforce lawyers' professional obli-
gations generally. See PuurixG, supra note 144. The practice does not
seem to have been different in Chancery. See Dungey v. Angove, 2 Ves.
Jun. 307, 30 Eng. Rep. 644 (Ch. 1794); Gilbert v. Cooper, 15 Sim. 343,
60 Eng. Rep. 651 (Oh. 1848). But see 2 Cox Ca. 283 (1791).
153. The occasional confusion probably stems from the mistaken
analysis of Ex parte Robbins & Jackson, 63 N.C. 309, 312 (1869), an early
and fairly influential American statement on the subject. A similar con-
fusion of the contempt power with the disbarment power (not the sum-
mary application power) is shown in In re Los Angeles County Pioneer
Society, 217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954), reversing In re Lavine, 126 F. Supp.
39 (S.D. Cal 1954). (The reversal was probably correct on minimal due
process grounds either way, however.)
154. In any due process balancing on this subject one should keep
in mind the argument that in order to be effective, any mechanism to
regulate dishonesty in pleading should be flexible and administered by
the judge who also handles the case. See Pogson, supra note 4, at 71.
155. The summary application type power has generally been recog-
nized in American courts when the issue has arisen in various contexts,
with varying degrees of analytical and historical cogency. See the cases
collected at 6 CoRPus Jums Attorney & Client §& 111, 112 (1916).
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at least where the legislature has not specifically withheld the
power.'5 6
American lawyers and American courts have always been
less than agressive in using their powers to fasten liability onto
other lawyers. The slightly more aggressive posture of the
British courts might be explained by the fact that, almost inevit-
ably, charges of misconduct were leveled against solicitors, since
barristers then and now insulated themselves against provable
accusations of accessory status in regard to improper litigation
decisions by insisting upon having only limited and hypothetical
knowledge of the case. 157 Of course, judges were once barris-
ters, not solicitors.
One might argue that Kinee violates legislative judgments
inherent in the statute now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This
statute states that counsel may be made personally liable for
increased "costs" produced by his or her "multiplying ... pro-
ceedings . . .unreasonably and vexatiously .... ,,58 One can
assert that Congress intended section 1927 to be the exclusive
source of power to fasten a personal obligation to make a money
payment upon a lawyer. If this is so, then perhaps there was
insufficient factfinding in Kinee to proceed under the, authoriza-
tion of section 1927 at all. Even if there were a sufficient implied
finding of multiplying the proceedings "unreasonably and vexa-
tiously," it could be further contended that Congress intended to
restrict section 1927 awards to statutory costs and not include
full expenses such as attorney's fees. The Supreme Court has
never interpreted section 1927, though it has existed in substanti-
ally the same form for 162 years. There does not seem to be
any legislative history on its promulgation. It seems probable
that when it was passed, it was intended only as a codification
of the common law and a reminder to the judiciary of their
156. It should be noted that an opposite result was reached under
Rule 11 language, without extensive analysis, by the Supreme Court of
Colorado in 1957. Nelson v. District Court, 320 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1957).
157. FREEDmAx, supra note 2, at 105-112.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1971). The reluctance of American courts and
lawyers to impose expenses on an attorney is illustrated by the history
of this section. The statute was originally promulgated in 1813, Act of
July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 21 (1813), but did not figure in the
decision of a reported case until over 90 years later, In re Zier & Co.,
127 F. 399 (D. Ind. 1904), affd, 142 F. 102 (7th Cir. 1905). Even in this
case, the statute was only peripheral to the court's decision,
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inherent power. If that view were accepted, there the matter
might rest.1 9
Unfortunately, until recently, the dominant interpretation
reflected in the few cases decided under the statute was that the
word "costs" meant only the scheme of statutorily allowable costs
that Congress created in 1853,160 and could not include compen-
sation for actual expenses, including attorney's fees.1 1 Since,
due to inflation, the costs provided by the statutory schedule had
become mere token allowances by the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury,162 this view virtually eliminated any usefulness the statu-
tory provision might have had.
The decisions construing section 1927 thus restrictively were
clearly influenced by the oft-repeated wisdom that the allowance
of costs was unknown at common law, and was of statutory
origin; 63 hence, without an authorizing statute, costs could not
159. Toledo Metal Wheel Co. v. Foyer Bros. & Co., 223 F. 350 (6th
Cir. 1915), seems to accept this interpretation in principle.
160. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 162 (1853).
161. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63 (2d Cir.),
modifying 192 F. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); In re Realty Assoc. Sec. Corp., 53
F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); Bone v. Walsh Constr. Co., 235 F. 901
(S.D. Iowa 1916).
162. The following language from Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Steiner is instructive:
The question here is not what the law should be, but what it is.
Unquestionably, the laws of New York are much more liberal
in the matter of costs and allowances than those of the United
States, where the costs are hardly more than nominal. In iso-
lated cases the inability of the court to make an adequate allow-
ance may produce hardship. But, on the other hand, the federal
system has advantages which are obvious to all who have prac-
tices in the courts of the United States.
201 F. 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1912).
163. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851 (1929). For a summary
of the history, see id. at 852-54. Despite the supposed "statutory" origin
of costs, much of the law of costs was in fact judge-made; the whole
complex English law up until 1875 grew by decision or court rule from
a few statutes. Compare for example the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw.
1, c. 1 (1278), for centuries the basis of awarding costs to plaintiffs, with
what Lord Coke purported to extract from it at 2 E. CoKE, INsrIrUTES 283
(1644).
In England, the Courts of Equity assumed a power to award and
mold costs independent of statute. Jones v. Coxater, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng.
Rep. 642 (Oh. 1742); Corp. of Burford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551, 26 Eng.
Rep. 731 (Ch. 1743); Goodhart, supra at 854. American courts have per-
haps rightly not been too aggressive in exercising the equitable power
in the face of an apparently general statute, though the power has gen-
erally been recognized. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59 (1975), and the cases there cited. It is of
great importance that the Court in Alyeska Pipeline specifically avoided
justifying all past judicial exceptions to the statutory cost scheme by
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be awarded in any case. However, even accepting this historical
proposition at face value, it is not necessary to restrict section
1927 to the 1853 schedule of costs. The main rationale for doing
so is the language of the 1853 statute, which provided "that in
lieu of the compensation now allowed by law to attorneys, solici-
tors, and proctors in the United States courts . . . the following
and no other compensation shall be ... allowed," 16 4 and then
went on to list specific allowable items. Until 1853, the federal
courts followed state practice in awarding attorney's fees as
costs.16 5 During this period a number of American states fol-
lowed what is now known as the "English" rule rather than the
"American" rule,166 so that full attorney's fees were recover-
able, either by court order or under a statutory schedule of allow-
ances that reasonably approximated actual fees.' 67  It is in this
context that what is now section 1927 was originally enacted in
tortured reference to equitable powers, and refrained from restricting the
power to equitable proceedings: "These exceptions are unquestionably
assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow attorney's fees in par-
ticular situations, unless forbidden by Congress . . . ." Id. at 259. If
exceptions are to be fashioned by judicial action they should depend on
policy, not historical accident. But see the dissent of Mr. Justice Mar-
shall, in which the term "equitable" is used so broadly as to erase any
historical distinctions. Id. at 272-88.
164. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161 (1853) (substantially
still in effect as 28 U.S.C. § 1920). The Supreme Court has held that the
omission of the clause "and no other compensation shall be allowed" in
the 1948 re-codification was not intended to work a substantive change.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 255
n.29 (1975).
165. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
247-48 (1975).
166. The '"nglish Rule"-"American Rule" classification is in com-
mon usage. See id. at 247. The so-called "English Rule" regarding costs
is that a winning party is entitled to compensation as a matter of course
for litigation expenses which would still be in his pocket but for the
actions of the loser (now known to have been unjustified) in prosecuting
or resisting the lawsuit. The American approach of disallowing recovery
of attorney's fees by a prevailing party in the absence of statutory au-
thorization assumes that the controversy was (as many are) a good faith
controversy in which reasonable people could have disagreed. It recog-
nizes that the courts are there for the resolution of such controversies,
and that the expenses of such litigation are merely a hazard of life which
cannot justly be imposed entirely on either of the two (presumably) rea-
sonably disagreeing parties to the lawsuit. One can debate the relative
merits of each approach at great length on many fronts, as, for instance,
which approach stimulates more shady litigation, discourages more just
litigation, or is inherently fairer. See Goodhart, supra note 163, at 874-
78, and the authorities collected in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270-71 n.45 (1975). See also Fleischman
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 766 (1966).
167. Goodhart, supra note 163, at 873-74.
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1813. The lack of uniformity in measuring awardable attorney's
fees among the states, and the size of the awards given in some
states as a matter of course to the victorious party, later prompted
Congress to pass the 1853 law.168 But the language of that stat-
ute as originally enacted seems exclusively directed at costs
awardable as a matter of course, that is, those that flow from the
simple fact of victory. This is clear from the mandatory language
of the statute that such costs "shall be allowed."'169 It is far from
clear that this section was intended to affect at all the situation
covered by section 1927. It is certainly a tenable interpretation
that, whatever its position on the propriety of attorney fee
awards as a matter of course,'1 70 Congress intended extraordinary
awards under section 1927 to be treated differently and to be
fully compensable.
Further, the Supreme Court of the United States, in several
recent cases seems to have accepted the legitimacy of at least a
narrow judicial power to fashion exceptions to the "American"
rule.17 ' In both F.D. Rich v. Industrial Lumber Co.172 and
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,17 3 the Court
recognized a "bad faith" exception as a general proposition. The
Court stated in Rich:
The American Rule has not served, however, as an absolute
bar to the shifting of attorneys' fees even in the absence of
168. See remarks of Senator Bradbury, 27 Cong. Globe App., 32d
Congress, 2d Sess., 207 (Feb. 12, 1853), reprinted in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 251 (1975).
169. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 162 (1853).
170. The fee schedules provided in 1853 may not have been hand-
some, but at least in 1853 dollars they were not comic. The attorneys'
docket fee of twenty dollars would be equivalent to about four hundred
1974 dollars. Moreover, the more involved, and hence more expensive,
types of federal litigation such as antitrust, securities, and civil rights
actions, had not then been created.
171. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240 (1975); F.D. Rich. Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974);
Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1966).
In Fleischman the Court spoke of sanctioning such exceptions "when
overriding considerations of justice seemed to compel such a result." 386
U.S. at 718.
172. 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1973). This decision was the first general
formulation of a "bad faith" exception by the Supreme Court.
173. 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975), adopting and reinforcing the lan-
guage of F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1973).
The majority accepts judicial power to fashion exceptions as a general
proposition, but rejects its exercise on the rationale proferred in the case
then before it. See note 161 supra. The reinforced acceptance of the
general "bad faith" exception to the usual rule of costs is as potentially
important a part of Alyeska Pipeline as its rejection of the proffered
"private attorney general" exception.
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statute or contract.... We have long recognized that attor-
ney's fees may be awarded to a successful party when his op-
ponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons .... 174
This would seem to suggest that section 1927 itself should be
interpreted to authorize awards of attorneys' fees, for what could
better qualify as "bad faith" than vexatiously multiplying
proceedings?
Finally the whole idea that section 1927 should even be
affected by rules of construction and restricted judicial power
springing from the general history of party and party costs is
questionable. One should not confuse the law of costs between
party and party with the law of "costs" chargeable to an attorney
for malfeasance before the court. The latter law is not even
arguably of statutory origin, and should not be governed by rules
of statutory qualification concerning the former. This is not to
say that the legislature might not affirmatively regulate and
structure the court's inherent common law power to fasten com-
pensatory costs upon erring attorneys. It is merely to say that
section 1927 was not intended to do so. 175
In summary, to hold that the Court in Kinee was correct
does not collide with section 1927, and is more in harmony with
the Supreme Court's recognition of a "bad faith" exception to
the law of costs between party and party than any contrary posi-
tion would be. It affirms a general proposition that when any
person under the authority of the court takes a position dishon-
estly or frivolously and expenses arise from that action, that
person should pay full compensation.
This, moreover, is basically the position adopted in several
other federal rules: FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (g), relating to costs result-
ing from bad faith affidavits in connection with summary judg-
ment; FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (a) (4), relating to costs resulting from
failure to make discovery; FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (c), relating to the
costs of failure to admit; and FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (d), relating inter
alia to costs of failure to attend one's own deposition. It should
174. 417 U.S. at 129 (footnote omited).
175. It must have been these or similar considerations which led the
Seventh Circuit in 1968 to authorize an award of attorney's fees under
section 1927. Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1171
(7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969). It is a little difficult
to tell exactly what the court considered, however, since it neither cited
cases contra nor discussed the point. A later award of $4000 attorney's
fees was entered by the district court and upheld by the court of ap-
peals in unreported opinions, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971). See
Annot., 12 A.L.R. FED. 910 (1972).
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be noted that under both FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (4) and 37 (d) an
attorney can be made personally liable for such costs, including
attorney's fees, in order to fully compensate the party aggrieved
by the failure. Apropos of this, I find it difficult to believe that
less could be intended by way of awards of attorney's fees in
compensation for expenses incurred under Rule 11 than under
Rule 37 (c).
So, in favor of Judge Newcomer's action in the Kinee case,
we have the historical power of the courts over attorneys prac-
ticing before them to ensure that no one is damaged by the attor-
ney's misconduct; the language of Rule 11 allowing "other
disciplinary action;" the examples found in Rules 56 and 37; and
the now firmly recognized bad faith exception to the American
rule of costs. Against the Newcomer approach we have the usual
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927; the argument that this section
represents the entire power of a federal court to order compen-
sation for a Rule 11 violation (an inclusio unius argument); and
the fact that Rule 11 fails to mention attorney fee awards, while
Rule 37 shows that the draftsmen were aware of them and of
the possibility of fastening them upon attorneys. There can per-
haps be no absolute demonstration of the inevitable correctness
of one position or the other in the face of the ambiguities of Rule
11 in its present form, but the strongest argument that Judge
Newcomer's action is the proper action under Rule 11 is that it
was reasonable, fair, and just and promoted the ends of the Rule
more than any other which comes to mind. And, at least in close
cases, those considerations should settle a controversy.
VI. GOOD GROUND
Our final and perhaps most important question is: How is
one to judge the presence of a violation of Rule 11? What con-
stitutes "good ground"?1" 6
176. Since there are a number of references to the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility [hereinafter cited as CPR] in this section, an ex-
planation of its scheme might be helpful. There are nine canons, which
are basically broad statements akin to topic headings which the Pream-
ble to the CPR calls "axiomatic norms." Each canon is followed by a
section of Ethical Considerations [hereinafter cited as EC], and Disci-
plinary Rules [hereinafter cited as DR] both of which are footnoted.
The Ethical Considerations raise possible ethical dilemmas under the
canon, and give guides for conduct. The Disciplinary Rules are '"manda-
tory," that is, they state the binding precepts of the Code. The Ethical
Considerations are supposed to be "aspirational," but they may often be
read as less demanding than the Disciplinary Rules. See note 185 infra,
comparing the tone of EC 7-3 and EC 7-4 taken together with DR 7-102
(A) (2).
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An exploration of the concept of "good ground" raises a
number of closely related questions. What must be known in
order to have good ground to allege or deny a proposition of fact?
What should be done if an allegation or denial has been made
upon good ground, but subsequently obtained knowledge de-
stroys that ground? Must one have good ground for legal as
well as factual propositions, and what might the term mean in
that context? Is a certification that there is good ground for
a complaint improper when there is clear knowledge of the
existence of a good defense? All of these questions will be
discussed below.
The heart of the good ground question is the application of
the concept to factual allegations or denials. Under the federal
system the theoretical strength of the circumstantial nexus that
is required to justify an allegation is the same for both affirma-
tive propositions and denials. 177 We can gain some insight on
judging what strength of inference is necessary by exploring
some hypothetical situations. The ones that follow all utilize
affirmative allegations as examples for the sake of convenience
in comparison, but what is said may be applied mutatis mutandis
to denials as well.
Suppose that a client comes to his attorney and says: "I've
just been assaulted. John Jones, a friend of mine, did it in a
fit of anger. However, he's judgment proof, but I think we can
sue Lou Jones, his rich twin brother, and win." Clearly if the
attorney files a complaint alleging that rich Lou assaulted his
client, the attorney violates Rule 11. This would be a knowingly
fraudulent pleading, and such a pleading must inevitably be said
to lack "good ground."'u7
177. See note 183 infra.
178. Old Canon 15 (ABA Canon of Professional Ethics No. 15
(1908)) (original version of ABA Canons) forbade "any manner of
fraud or chicane," which, whatever else that may mean, would apply
here. Old Canon 30 stated; "The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil
cause or to make a defense when convinced that it is intended merely
to harass or to injure the opposite party, or to work oppression or wrong
...." Whatever else this means it should apply here.
Under CPR canon 7, DR 7-102 (A) (1) states:
Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
(A) In his representation of a Client, a lawyer shall not:(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay
a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client
when he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another.
This rule would undoubtedly apply here. Note that DR 7-102 (A) (1)
adopts a form of objective rather than purely subjective standard of
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Now suppose that instead of the story above, the client tells
his attorney this account: "I've just been assaulted. I don't
know who did it, but on a hunch, I've picked Sam Smith out
of the city phone book as the culprit." It is certain that an attor-
ney filing a complaint against Smith for assault under these cir-
cumstances has violated Rule 11. Yet he has no affirmative
knowledge that Smith was not the culprit. It is apparent that
the bare ability to claim that there is no positive evidence that
an allegation is untrue is not enough to furnish "good
ground." 179
Affirmative and suggestive circumstances are apparently
required to satisfy Rule 11, but the big question is, how suggestive
must the circumstances be? Let us carry our previous hypotheti-
cal one step further. Suppose the client says to his attorney:
"Last night I was beat up. I don't know who did it for sure,
but I think it was Charley Summers. He has threatened to beat
me up because he thinks I cheated him when we were partners."
This, without more, or the possibility to obtain more, would prob-
ably be a sufficiently suggestive circumstantial situation to
justify an allegation of assault by Summers under Rule 11. The
exact judgment concerning the sufficiency of the inference is one
that cannot be quantified, and we must inevitably fall back on
the good faith of attorneys in making close judgments. Certain
helpful observations can be made, however.
First, the circumstantial nexus between what is known here
and the allegation to be made is clearly closer than it was in
the phone book case above.' s0 In some cases, the nexus might
be so remote as to virtually preclude good faith allegation.
Second, it is probably accurate to say that Rule 11 imposes upon
an attorney some duty of affirmative investigation.' 8 ' What
judgment ("or when it is obvious"). See text accompanying notes 190-
93 infra for a discussion of the subjective standards of Rule 11.
179. Kinee seems to be a case of this kind. The court in Freeman
v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), properly rejected an attempt to
limit Rule 11 only to pleadings affirmatively known to be false. Id. at
397.
180. See notes 139-40 supra and accompanying text.
181. Such a duty of investigation has been recognized by a number
of courts. See Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1972); Kae-
hni v. Diffraction Co., 342 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1972), affd mem. 47a
F.2d 908 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Bill's Farm Center, 52 F.R.D. 114 (W.D. Mo. 1970). See also Reed v.
Turner, 2 F.R.D. 12 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Ice Plant Equipment Co. v. Marto-
cello, 43 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Nieman v. Bethlehem Nat'1 Bank,
32 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd, 113 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1940); Nieman
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is required by that duty in a particular case is difficult to define
with confident generality. At the very least, it is the detailed
probing of one's own client which a competent attorney will do
anyway for other, more practical, reasons. Thus in the case of
the disgruntled partner just discussed, the attorney would be
bound to elicit all the facts surrounding the alleged threats, the
assault, and the past relationship of the client and Summers, the
better to judge the reasonableness of the allegation that Summers
assaulted the client. But the duty to investigate may go further
in a particular case. This will depend on a number of factors.
How easy would further relevant investigation be? How expen-
sive would it be compared to the size of the litigation? What
type of case is involved? Is it one likely to injure the reputation
of the defendant by merely being brought, or is it more innocu-
ous? How will the allegation affect the party opponent? How
much expense will he incur in defending? What functions do
the pleadings serve in a particular system? 8 2
The relevance of each of these factors is more or less obvious,
but a word of caution is in order. They go only to judging the
duty to investigate, and some are more important than others.
If, under the circumstances, it is apparent that investigation
would be fruitless or outrageously expensive or both, the other
factors are irrelevant, and the only consideration is the existence
of the proper suggestive circumstantial nexus without more. At-
torneys must still represent clients, and a client should not be
made to forego an inferably appropriate claim (or defense) where
further investigation appears impractical, even if the conse-
quences of the suit are onerous for the other party. A pleading
v. Long, 31 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1939) (a series of cases in which Judge
Kirkpatrick, without mentioning Rule 11, excoriated the use of the gen-
eral denial in federal practice and spoke of a duty of investigation).
Compare the "reasonable inquiry" requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 36 (a)
regarding responses to requests for admission. See generally M. ORKIN,
LEGAL ETics: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 80-81 (1957).
182. It is of course clear that a party may have good ground for
the allegation of each of two inconsistent theories of a claim-usually
when the party has no first hand knowledge of what actually happened,
and each theory is consistent with what is known. In such a case it
is proper to plead both theories. City of Kingsport v. Steel & Roof
Structure, Inc., 500 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Peter Kiewit
& Sons Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 442 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1969); Car-
roll v. Morrison Hotel, 149 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1945). This result
is virtually dictated by the authorizations of F)_. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) for de-
mands for relief in the alternative, FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (a) for joinder of
claims in the alternative, and FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (a) for joinder of parties
solely on alternative theories.
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rule should not require an attorney to allege only sure winners
for which overwhelming admissible evidence is in hand. One
proper function of a legal system that undertakes the redress
of private grievances is providing a mechanism of investigation
where there is a reasonable suspicion of legal wrong, thereby
ensuring that the wolves may not too easily hide among the
sheep. A judge must be extremely cautious in deciding that what
he personally believes to be a weak circumstantial nexus to sup-
port an allegation or denial is actually so weak that it violates
Rule 11. All of the assumptions behind the reforms of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure indicate a general weakening of the
circumstantial nexus which the system demands to support the
assertion of any affirmative proposition. 183
Under earlier systems perhaps a party was expected to make
only allegations that he knew or believed he could probably sup-
port with admissible evidence at trial. This made it easy for
wolves to hide among the sheep, for -these systems so valued not
bothering the sheep with the inconvenience of a potential "fishing
expedition" that a wily wolf could remain quite comfortably con-
cealed. The great expansion of the discovery process in the Fed-
eral Rules, coupled with the switch to broad notice pleading, indi-
cates a subtle but important change. The federal civil action
today serves two proper and important functions. One is its
traditional function of giving a remedy to those who know they
have been injured in violation of the law. The other is to pro-
vide a means by which those who reasonably think they have
'been so injured, but are not sure, may find out, when other
sources of investigation are impracticable. Too grudging a defini-
tion of the circumstantial nexus that constitutes good ground
183. Note that the circumstantial nexus standard required for a
denial has been raised by the application of Rule 11 in some places. See
Pogson, supra note 4. This is not due to any difference between the
nexus required for affirmative allegations and denials under the federal
system. It is because there used to be a lower standard for denials in
those jurisdictions under the civil analogue to the privilege against self-
incrimination which has been rejected by the federal rules. See note 4
supra. So now throughout the federal system the circumstantial stand-
ard necessary to justify all allegations is a uniform one, that of "good
ground".
Indeed, it is likely that the most common Rule 11 violation is the
dishonest denial. This is partly because a civil analogue to the fifth
amendment seems to be still widely assumed in practice, and partly be-
cause it takes a more abandoned heart to go to the trouble of filing a
false claim, with all that that entails, than merely to be dishonest in
denial when the alternative is immediate defeat by judgment on the
pleadings.
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could discourage attorneys and choke off the latter function,
which is increasingly important in a world where technology
allows actionable conduct to be secretly undertaken and easily
concealed.
Now we must consider whether it is possible to violate Rule
11 by taking a legal position which is so bizarre or wrong that
there can be said to be no good ground to support it. This raises
questions of frivolity rather than sham. At first glance we would
probably be inclined to say yes, such a violation is possible. If
an attorney signs a complaint claiming damages because the
defendant unjustly thought evil thoughts about the plaintiff,
there would seem to be little behind such an action except
harassment. But we must be extremely cautious. Today's frivol-
ity may be tomorrow's law, and the law often grows by an
organic process in which a concept is conceived, then derided as
absurd (and clearly not the law), then accepted as theoretically
tenable (though not the law), then accepted as the law. As a
recent example we have the proposition that mutuality of
estoppel is not or should not be a sine qua non for the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel.184 We must be very cautious not to
discourage attorneys from advancing such concepts or to penalize
them for doing so. How might the law have developed if, prior
to 1954, an attorney might have been sanctioned for asserting,
contrary to settled Supreme Court case law, that separate but
equal was not equal? In a subjective sense, an unusual or unpre-
cedented legal position may be justified if the attorney believes
that it should be the law. That would lead, however, to justifi-
cation of one of the most questionable practices relating to "good
ground"-continuously raising legal issues in a series of cases
even though the issues have been clearly and dispositively
decided against the asserted position by a recent decision of the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, we would not want to make an
attorney's belief in the propriety of a position a requirement of
good ground (though it might be one basis for good ground)
because attorneys are supposed to advance proper legal positions
for their clients whether they personally believe in the position
or not. One might say that good ground is lacking where the
legal rule put forth is so weak that any lawyer would know that
the probability of its acceptance was virtually zero, and where,
in addition, the signing attorney did not himself affirmatively
184. See Therfield v. Postman's Fifth Ave. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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believe that the proposition should be law.185 But even this
narrow course could raise serious questions. In spite of the fact
that there are a few cases which can only be rationalized on such
a ground, 8 6 a court should be very cautious before it ever finds
a Rule 11 violation based on the improper espousal of a legal
position.
A few concluding points: first, Rule 11 should probably be
construed to impose upon the signing attorney a duty of continu-
ing certification of good ground for the allegations contained
therein. Suppose an attorney has good ground to deny the exist-
ence of any contract between a deceased party whose estate he
represents and the plaintiff. Before trial, the situation develops
to a point where the original denial would have been a violation
if the attorney had then known what he knows now. Under such
a construction, if he does not take steps to amend the original
answer, he violates Rule 11. I think this reading of the duty
imposed by the Rule is the one most in line with the Rule's pur-
185. CPR EC 7-4 skirts the issue with the following language:
The advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law
favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion
as to the likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail.
His conduct is within the bounds of the law, and therefore per-
missible, if the position taken is supported by the law or is
supportable by a good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of the law. However, a lawyer is not justified
in asserting a position in litigation that is frivolous.
Just how one is to tell the difference between a "good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law" and a "frivolous
position" is not clear. We are told in CPR EC 7-3 that "[w]hile serving
as an advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts
as to the bounds of the law." CPR DR 7-102 (A) (2) then goes on to
forbid "knowingly [advancing] a claim or defense that is unwarranted
under existing law, except that... [a lawyer] may advance such claim
or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law." This seems more demand-
ing in emphasis than the Ethical Consideration quoted. It also seems
more to restate the problem than to create a rule to help resolve
it. Perhaps clearly restating the problem is the best we can currently
do. It may be more practical in some areas to strive to alert the bar
to the existence of a dilemma than to attempt to enforce or even arrive
at a particular resolution of it. There are probably those who would
hold that Rule 11- itself is best treated in this way.
186. See Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors
Corp., 15 FED. R. SERv. 2d 11.41 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd on other grounds,
463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Denis v. Perfect Parts Inc.,
142" F. Supp. 263 (D. Mass. 1956), which does not deal directly with a
violation of Rule 11, but rather with the analogous attorney good faith
requirement relating to an affidavit of bias under the recusement statute,
28 U.S.C. 144 (1971). Cf. Kaehni v. Diffraction Co., 342 F. Supp. 523(D. Md. 1972), affd, 473 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854
(1973).
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pose. If the Rule is designed to obtain a lawyer's certification
that there are proper issues on which to spend the court's and
the opposing party's time, then only a continuing certification
requirement fully promotes the purpose of the Rule.'8 7
Second, I earlier took the position that an attorney could
properly rely upon the rules regarding the burden of plead-
ing.188 What this means, in its broadest implications, is that
filing an affirmative pleading, even with absolute knowledge of
the existence of a good defense, is not a violation of Rule 11.
It is for the other side to elect to utilize the defense or not. How-
ever, one can make a strong argument that there should be a
distinction between defenses which involve germane issues cen-
tral to the existence of the primary right sued upon, and those
which may defeat such a primary right for extrinsic policy rea-
sons unrelated to the intrinsic characteristics of the basic right.
Limitations and infancy belong to the latter group, and the
existence of fraud, occurrence of conditions subsequent, and
others, to the former. If such a distinction is accepted, then one
could rely on the assignment of the burden of pleading in regard
to "extrinsic" defenses, but if there were sure knowledge of the
existence of fraud or other "intrinsic" defenses, there would not
be good ground for a claim, even when there was no actual un-
truth in the pleading itself. The difficulty with taking such a
position is the inevitable wrangling that would result over which
defense was "intrinsic" and which "extrinsic," but its virtue is
that it recognizes that there is something ethically questionable
about bringing a claim knowing that the primary right of recov-
ery is simply non-existent. 8 9
Third, it should be noted that the standards of Rule 11 are
subjective standards, that is, that violation is dependent upon
what the attorney knew and believed at the relevant time. Thus,
as presently drawn, an attorney merely certifies "to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief," and a violation must be
187. The Rule was so construed in AAA v. Rothman, 101 F. Supp.
193 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). The problem with such a construction is that the
language of the Rule makes it sound as if the certification is limited
to the point of signature of the pleading. Any revision of Rule 11 should
include a duty of continuing certification, along the lines of FED. R. Civ.
P. 26 (e) (2)'s provisions for required updating of certain responses to dis-
covery.
188. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
189. Something of this sort seems to underlie the opinion in In re
Lavine, 126 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
In re Los Angeles Co. Pioneer Assocs., 217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954).
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"with intent to defeat the purposes of the rule" or "wilful" before
any of the enforcement provisions can come into play. Subjec-
tive standards for ethical guidance or discipline have recently
come under heavy attack'9 0 as unenforceable, since attorneys
can always avoid them by saying they did not really know for
sure that something was wrong.' 9 ' I would suggest that the
problem has not been with the standards but with the enforcers
of those standards. There is nothing inherently unworkable
about subjective standards. If there were, the requirement of
scienter would render convictions in criminal cases impos-
sible. 9 2 The problem arises when the finder of fact is not
willing to indulge in the normal process of circumstantial infer-
ence concerning the intentional or wilful nature of an act because
he empathizes too closely with the attorney who is the subject
of the inquiry. Intellectually honest examination of evidence
proffered in particular cases can result in the effective enforce-
ment of even subjective standards of ethics. This is not to say
that if the Rule were redrafted, the standard might not be better
if made objective.193 However, this would sometimes take us
from the realm of ethical consideration to the realm of negligence.
Negligent behavior may sometimes smack of unethical behavior*
especially when the negligence is the product of the more or less
wilful creation or tolerance of sloppy work habits breeding negli-
gent mistakes, none of which may individually be wilful. But
190. See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at ch. 5.
191. F EDmmAN, supra note 2, at 56.
192. Although Dean Freedman criticizes subjective standards, in fair-
ness to him, he does realize that subjective standards of knowledge work
in the criminal area; he is skeptical of their potential effectiveness when
applied to lawyers by lawyers. See FREM AwN, supra note 2, at ch. 5.
193. The problem with subjective standards is enforceability. The
problem with objective standards is that they inevitably cover some peo-
ple whose actions were only the result of negligence. However, it might
better promote the ends of Rule 11 if it also reprobated gross negligence.
This standard would encompass actions such as the filing of an un-
founded suit which proper investigation would have revealed was un-
founded, or the assertion of denials or defenses in similar circumstances.
As we have seen, some courts have already imposed such a duty of in-
vestigation. See note 181 supra. Of course, knowing dereliction of the
duty is unethical, but many derelictions are probably negligent. An ob-
jective standard would clearly cover such situations, and would en-
courage the courts to enforce the provision more vigorously, since finding
a violation would not carry the inevitable implication of affirmative sin.
See text accompanying note 88 supra.
When all is said and done, it may be that Rule l's most impor-
tant function is not as a definable and enforceable set of standards, but
as an exhortation to lawyers to examine themselves and their cases
forthrightly and in good conscience.
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some negligent mistakes have no ethical dimension at all. At
any rate, the current standards are subjective, and should be
reasonably workable if properly approached by the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Rule 11 seeks to obtain honesty in pleadings and other papers
by requiring the signature of an attorney, and by requiring that
there be good ground to support the document signed. Good
ground cannot exist as to any alleged proposition known to be
false, including a denial; further, an attorney must erigage in
reasonable investigation to determine the probability of any
proposition he proposes to allege in a pleading or other document.
In the common class of cases, where after investigation the attor-
ney is neither sure that a proposition is true nor that it is false,
the Rule demands at least a suggestive circumstantial nexus
which would justify concluding that the truth of the proposition
is likely enough to warrant resort to the discovery mechanism
of the civil action to investigate it or to a jury to decide it.
This standard is necessarily rather low so as not to discourage
attorneys from zealous representation, or choke off resolution of
the controversies that surround suspicious activity. The language
of the Rule makes the standard a subjective one, but this should
not pose many problems in good faith enforcement efforts, for
the legal process daily resolves such subjective issues, including
issues of intent in criminal cases, on the basis of which persons
are daily sent to prison. Furthermore, the signature should be
taken as continuing certification of good ground, so that if the
attorney uncovers circumstances which, had he known them
before, would have rendered the original signature improper, he
is under an obligation to come forward and amend the document
so that it conforms to his current knowledge. It may be possible
to violate Rule 11 by adopting a frivolous legal position in a docu-
ment, but again, a court must be extremely cautious in finding
such a violation, so as not to discourage attorneys from advocat-
ing positions which, though today perceived as absurd, may
become tomorrow's law.
As for the Rule itself, it is a piece of unfortunate draftsman-
ship. The reference to the power to "strike" a pleading for a
Rule 11 violation is inappropriate and of questionable consti-
tutionality, has no historical precedent, and should never be
invoked. All fact issues raised by pleadings or other papers
should be resolved by the usual litigation processes before ques-
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tions of honesty are addressed, and no investigation or discovery
directed only toward honesty should be allowed until such issues
have been resolved, by trial or otherwise, in the moving party's
favor. The only exception to this stricture would be dismissals,
which would eliminate the possibility of a truth or falsity deter-
mination in the normal course. In such a case the court might
inquire into honesty and falsity simultaneously, but no court
should ever attempt to determine honesty of allegations inde-
pendent of their truth or falsity. The normal response of a court
finding a Rule 11 violation should be to impose upon the offend-
ing attorney personally the expenses which have resulted from
the violation, including attorney's fees and other litigation ex-
penses. Further sanctions, such as disbarment or contempt
proceedings, might be called for in particular cases. Although
the Rule as currently drafted can be interpreted and administered
as just outlined, and the drafters very likely intended something
along these lines, the Rule should probably be revised to
eliminate the potential for confusion and mischief which is
currently inherent in the language of the Rule.
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